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Part I of this Note provides a brief political history of Nepal since the mid-eighteenth century;
defines the concept of transitional justice; and explores the international law of remedy, repa-
rations, and compensation. Part II focuses on the right to individual compensation in order to
determine which human rights violations trigger a state’s legal obligation to compensate victims,
and then applies that right to the transitional justice context. Finally, Part III proposes the design
of an individual compensation program in which Nepal, and other transitional states, can fulfill
legal obligations while simultaneously working toward peace, democracy, and development.
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INTRODUCTION
Some consider Nepal to be Shangri-la-or earthly utopia-
but its current situation is far from that. Having only emerged in
2006 from a ten-year internal conflict that left over 13,000 people
dead, Nepal is seeking its own Shangri-la: peace, democracy, and
development. This journey, however, is complicated by the
numerous human rights violations committed by the state during
the internal conflict. Not only do those whose human rights were
violated want redress from the state, but international law
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encourages-and sometimes mandates-justice for victims.
Providing that justice can be problematic for states like Nepal
that are attempting to transition away from war and authoritarian
rule toward peace and democracy, yet are underdeveloped and
impoverished.
Transitional justice is premised on the notion that a society
cannot have closure-and subsequently progress-unless it
addresses the problems of its past.' To achieve these goals,
transitional justice offers a range of mechanisms through which a
state can provide truth and justice to victims of human rights
violations.2 One such mechanism is individual compensation.3
This Note explores the intersection of transitional justice and
international human rights law concerning the right to
individual compensation. It examines the human rights
violations for which individual compensation is legally required
and discusses the alternative paradigm of compensation-as-
development as a potentially better solution to achieve the goals
of transitional justice.
Part I of this Note provides a brief political history of Nepal
since the mid-eighteenth century; defines the concept of
transitional justice; and explores the international law of remedy,
reparations, and compensation. Part II focuses on the right to
individual compensation in order to determine which human
rights violations trigger a state's legal obligation to compensate
victims, and then applies that right to the transitional justice
context. Finally, Part III proposes the design of an individual
compensation program in which Nepal, and other transitional
states, can fulfill legal obligations while simultaneously working
toward peace, democracy, and development.
I. NEPAL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW
Nestled in the Himalayas and situated between India and
China, Nepal is in transition. In 2006, Nepal's government and
the Communist Party Nepal-Maoists signed the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement ("CPA") ending a decade-long internal
1. See infra note 63 (defining transitional justice).
2. See infra I.B.2 (outlining truth commissions, prosecutions, and reparations as
mechanisms of transitional justice).
3. See infra note 117 (listing compensation as a category of reparations).
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conflict during which many human rights violations occurred.4 In
2008, Nepal's legislative body declared the state a secular
republic.' Despite these developments, Nepal cannot yet be
described as a peaceful, democratic society that has wholly
emerged from conflict and authoritarian rule.6
International human rights law imposes obligations on states
to give redress to victims of human rights violations, and
transitional justice recognizes that peace and democracy cannot
be achieved unless the state provides retroactive justice for
human rights violations. The intersection of these two
paradigms-transitional justice and international human rights
law-is the point at which transitioning states can fulfill their
international legal obligations, while ensuring that sustainable
peace and democracy are realized. Nepal provides a case study of
how an effective transitional justice program should be
structured at that intersection. The lessons learned from Nepal
could be adapted to other transitional societies.
Part L.A explores the modern political history of Nepal from
the mid-eighteenth century to the present, including the internal
conflict that lasted from 1996 to 2006. Part I.B outlines the
concept of transitional justice, including its definition, goals, and
mechanisms. Part I.C reviews international law on the right to
remedy, reparations, and compensation for human rights
violations.
A. A Brief Political History of Nepal
1. Nepal from the Mid-Eighteenth Century to 1990
A hereditary monarchy was established in Nepal in the mid-
eighteenth century by the Shah family, which ruled for 240
years.7 This period included one hundred years during which
4. See infra note 33 and accompanying text (describing the signing of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement ("CPA")).
5. See infra note 36 and accompanying text (describing the abolition of the
monarchy and the declaration of Nepal as a secular republic).
6. See infra notes 35-50 and accompanying text (detailing the current political
problems in Nepal).
7. See Michael Hutt, Monarchy, Democracy and Maoism in Nepal, in HIMALAYAN
PEOPLE'S WAR: NEPAL'S MAOIST REBELLION 1, 2 (Michael Hutt ed., 2004) ("The Shah
kings .. . are generally credited with having created the modem nation-state now known
as Nepal."); TERESA WHITFIELD, CONFLICT PREVENTION AND PEACE FORUM/CR. ON
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Nepal also had hereditary prime ministers whose governing
powers were greater than those of the monarch.8 From 1962 until
1990, Nepal experimented with the panchayat system of
governance, which was described as representative, but was in
reality one-party rule directed by the monarchy.9 Frustrated with
their lack of real representation, Nepalis started Jana Andolan
(People's Movement) I in 1990, which resulted in then-King
Birendra establishing a constitutional monarchy in a democratic
state.' 0 This first attempt at democracy was ineffective, however,
as political infighting and corruption produced a rapid
government turnover.11
2. Communists and Maoists in Nepal
The Communist Party of Nepal ("CPN") traces its roots back
to 1949 in Kolkata.'2 As the party developed, and for various
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, MASALA PEACEMAKING: NEPAL'S PEACE PROCESS AND THE
CONTRIBUTION OF OUTSIDERS 3 (2008) ("Nepal was ruled by a feudal and exclusionary
monarchy for more than 200 years."). See generally MANJUSHREE THAPA, FORGET
KATHMANDU: AN ELEGY FOR DEMOCRACY 57-79 (2d ed. 2007) (providing a detailed
history of the Shah family).
8. See Hutt, supra note 7, at 2 (" [T]he Shah kings' power was eclipsed by a courtly
family which adopted the title 'Rana."'); Whitfield, supra note 7, at 3 (noting that the
hereditary Rana prime ministers ruled Nepal from 1846-1951). See generally THAPA,
supra note 7, at 57-79 (providing a detailed history of the Rana dynasty).
9. See Brad Adams, Nepal at the Precipice, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 2005, at 121, 124
("The panchayat system was touted as a representative system, but in reality the country
was run by a cluster of like-minded undemocratic politicians who obeyed the will of the
king."). See generally THAPA, supra note 7, at 104-05 (describing elections under the
panchayat system and noting that the king directly appointed sixteen members to the
National Panchayat and "retained absolute power").
10. See Adams, supra note 9, at 124 ("In April 1990, following months of nationwide
strikes and agitation, King Binrendra ... finally gave in to popular demands to lift the
ban on political parties and create a democratic state."); Whitfield, supra note 7, at 3
("[The panchayat system] was brought to an end in 1990 when a pro-democracy
'people's movement' forced the then King Birendra to agree to multi-party democracy
within the framework of constitutional monarchy.").
11. See Adams, supra note 9, at 125 (noting that after the peoples' movement,
Nepal had thirteen increasingly unstable governments marked by political feuds and
corruption); Whitfield, supra note 7, at 3 ("The political system was undermined by
factionalism, shifting coalitions and alliances among and between parties, and
consequently a rapid succession of governments, particularly in the years of a hung
parliament between 1994 and 1999.").
12. Deepak Thapa, Radicalism and the Emergence of the Maoists, in HIMALAYAN
PEOPLE'S WAR, supra note 7, at 21; see also Hutt, supra note 7, at 3.
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reasons, the CPN split into different factions.13 For this Note, the
most important of those factions is what would become known as
the Communist Party Nepal-Maoists ("CPN-M" or "Maoists").
Led by Pushpa Kamala Dahal, commonly known as Prachanda,
and with Baburam Bhattarai as its ideologue, the CPN-M is
considered to have the most leftist ideology of the various
Communist factions.14 In March 1995, the CPN-M decided to
bring a democratic revolution to Nepal. 15 On February 4, 1996,
the party released its "Forty-Point Demands," which called for (1)
the expulsion of foreign influence in Nepal, (2) the
establishment of a secular democracy and the end to various
types of discrimination, and (3) economic reforms to benefit the
poor and marginalized. 16 After the government quickly rejected
the demands, the Maoists started what would become known as
the "people's war."17
3. Nepal's Internal Conflict: 1996-2006
The monarchy and the state were unprepared to fight the
Maoists in part because the state initially categorized the conflict
13. See Hutt, supra note 7, at 3 (noting that the Communist Party of Nepal has
splintered); Thapa, supra note 12, at 21-37 (providing a history of the Communist Party
of Nepal ("CPN")).
14. See Thapa, supra note 12, at 21, 34-37 (providing a history of the Communist
Party Nepal-Maoists ("CPN-M") and noting that it has an "ideological stance that is
farthest left"); Adams, supra note 9, at 127 (noting that the CPN-M broke away from the
Communist Party Nepal and is led by Pushpa Kamal Dahal).
15. At its Third Plenum in March 1995, the CPN-M wrote its "Strategy & Tactics of
Armed Struggle in Nepal." Strategy & Tactics of Armed Struggle in Nepal, CPN-MAOISTS,
Mar. 1995, available at http://www.ucpnm.org/english/doc2.php. The document
outlines, inter alia, the target and motivating forces for an armed struggle and notes that
the CPN-M "has formulated a political strategy of completing New Democratic
revolution." Id.; see also Thapa, supra note 12, at 36 (noting that as the CPN-M decided to
take up arms at its Third Plenum); S.D. Muni, The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Origin and
Evolution 6 (Nat'l Univ. of Sing. Inst. of S. Asian Studies, Working Paper No. 111, 2010),
available at http://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/Attachments/PublisherAttachment/ISAS_
WorkingPaper_1 11-Email-TheMaoist InsurgencyoLNepal-Origin andEvolution
28072010180455.pdf (noting that CPN-M documents from the Third Plenum described
the "strategy and tactics of armed struggle in Nepal").
16. The Forty-Point Demand of the United People's Front, Feb. 4, 1996, reprinted in
HIMALAYAN PEOPLE'S WAR, supra note 7, app. A, at 285.
17. See Thapa, supra note 12, at 37 ("On 13 February 1996, the CPN (Maoist)
struck in six districts. The people's war had begun."); Whitfield, supra note 7, at 3 ("The
start of the 'people's war' waged by the Community Party of Nepal (Maoist) ... against
the Nepali state dates back to February 1996 when the government rejected a forty-point
list of demands.").
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merely as a small-scale domestic uprising rather than an internal
conflict.18 By 2001, a counterinsurgency unit was formed to fight
the Maoists and assist the police forces.19 Real change in the war,
however, came later in 2001. In June, Crown Prince Dipendra
allegedly massacred ten members of the royal family, including
King Binrendra,20 and then allegedly shot himself.2' Gyanendra, a
surviving brother of the murdered King Binrendra, assumed the
throne.22 Several months into his tenure as king and still faced
with a Maoist insurgency, King Gyanedra declared a state of
emergency, deployed the Royal Nepal Army ("RNA") to fight the
Maoists, and introduced the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities
Ordinance, which granted broad powers to the security forces to
arrest people involved in "terrorist" activities.23 The CPN-M was
declared a terrorist organization.24 From this point until the end
18. See Whitfield, supra note 7, at 4 ("The government response was confused and
inadequate. As the Maoists laid plans for a protracted conflict, it addressed the
insurgency as a problem of law and order."); U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM'R FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS [OHCHR], CONFLICT-RELATED DISAPPEARANCES IN BARDIYA DISTRICT 20
(2008), available at http://www.swisspeace.ch/typo3/fileadmin/user-upload/Media/
Countries/Nepal/OHCHRConflictRelatedDisappearances.pdf ("In the initial years of
the conflict, only the police ... had been engaged in fighting the CPN-M.").
19. See Whitfield, supra note 7, at 4 (noting that the poorly trained and equipped
police force was supplemented "by a new armed police force formed specifically for the
purposes of counterinsurgency"); OHCHR, supra note 18, at 20 (stating that in 2001,
"the [Royal Nepal Army] was deployed for the first time to fight the CPN-M
insurgency").
20. See Adams, supra note 9, at 126; Whitfield, supra note 7, at 4 (providing an
account of the massacre). This dramatic event shook all of Nepal and led to various
conspiracy theories about what actually happened at the palace. See THAPA, supra note 7,
at 9-47 (providing a detailed account of the immediate aftermath of the massacre, the
reactions of Nepalis, and the emergence of conspiracy theories); Hutt, supra note 7, at 7
(noting that there was suspicion that Prince Gyandenda, the king's brother, played a
part in planning the massacre); Adams, supra note 9, at 126 (noting the same).
21. See Adams, supra note 9, at 126.
22. See id.; Hutt, supra note 7, at 7.
23. Terrorist and Disruptive Acts (Prevention and Punishment) Ordinance, 48
Nepal Gazette No. 51 (2001), available at http://www.nepalhomepage.com/politics/
nepgaz.html; Whitfield, supra note 7, at 4 (noting that King Gyanendra deployed the
army); ADVOCACY FORUM & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WAITING FORJUSTICE: UNPUNISHED
CRIMES FROM NEPAL'S ARMED CONFLICT 9 (2008) (noting that on November 26, 2001,
the state declared a nationwide state of emergency and deployed the Royal Nepal
Army).
24. Terrorist and Disruptive Acts, Additional 50 Part 3, available at
http://www.nepalhomepage.com/politics/nepgaz.html ("In exercise of the powers
conferred by sub-section (3) of Section 7 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Act (Control
and Punishment) Ordinance ... His Majesty's Government has declared as terrorist the
Nepal Community Party (Maoist) group .... ).
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of the war, human rights violations, committed by both the state
and the Maoists, dramatically increased.25
In May 2002, King Gyanendra dissolved Parliament. 26 Five
months later he replaced the elected government with one of his
own choice and suspended upcoming elections. 27 The political
situation changed little until February 2005 when King Gyanedra
effectively completed his coup; he declared another state of
emergency, imprisoned politicians and leaders of political
parties, shut off all phone lines and internet connections, and
suppressed the media.28 He asserted that these measures were
necessary responses to the Maoist insurgency, which was still
waging throughout Nepal despite attempts at peace talks and
ceasefires. 29
The king's efforts to consolidate his power had an
unintended consequence that ultimately destabilized his regime.
The divided political parties came together and established a
Seven-Party Alliance that began peace talks with the Maoists.30
25. See infra Part I.A.5 (discussing the human rights situation during the internal
conflict); see also ADVOCACY FORUM & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 23, at 10
(noting that a majority of civilian deaths caused by the internal conflict occurred after
the Royal Nepal Army was deployed).
26. Michael Hutt, King Gyanendra Coup and Its Implications for Nepal's Future, BROWN
J. OF WORLD AFF., Summer/Fall 2005, at 111, 112 (2005); Whitfield, supra note 7, at 5
("Parliament was dissolved in May 2002 at the recommendation of Prime Minister
Deuba.").
27. See Adams, supra note 9, at 126 ("[King Gyanendra] sacked the prime minister,
assumed executive authority himself, appointed his own prime minister and cabinet,
and postponed elections indefinitely."); Whitfield, supra note 7, at 5 ("[O]n 4 October
2002 King Gyanendra dismissed the elected government, replaced it with one of his own
choosing ... and suspended the elections that had been planned for the following
month.").
28. See Adams, supra note 9, at 126 ("[King Gyanendra] staged a well-planned
takeover of the entire government. He cut of the country from the rest of the world,
shutting down all phone lines (land and mobile), all Internet connections, and the
airport. The press was given very clear instructions about what it could and could not
report, with military censors installed in newsrooms. All FM radio stations .. . were
directed to broadcast only entertainment."); Whitfield, supra note 7, at 6 ("On 1
February 2005 Gyanendra seized power in a coup, imprisoned the leaders of the
political parties and civil society and declared a state of emergency."); ADVOCACY FORUM
& HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 23, at 10 (noting that in February 2005, King
Gyanendra "ordered the detention of thousands of political activists, journalists, and
human rights monitors, and imposed severe restrictions on civil liberties").
29. See Whitfield, supra note 7, at 6 (noting that King Gyanendra cited the need to
defeat the Maoists as the reason for his coup).
30. See id. ("In the following months, as he defied international pressure to return
Nepal to a democratic process and respect the rights of his people, King Gyanendra in
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From these talks, the parties concluded a twelve-point agreement
in November 2005 that aimed to restore peace and democracy to
Nepal.3' These events galvanized Nepalis and led to Jana Andolan
(People's Movement) II, which culminated in April 2006 when
the people forced the king to give up his power and return power
to the parliament.32
4. From "Peace" Onward: 2006-Present
Nepal's government and the CPN-M signed a
Comprehensive Peace Agreement on November 21, 2006,33
officially ending the ten-year conflict in Nepal and setting up an
interim constitution. 34 Nearly four years after the CPA ostensibly
brought peace and democracy to Nepal, both are still tenuous.
Since 2006, Nepal has had three different governments and
prime ministers. The first elections for Nepal's legislative body,
the Constituent Assembly ("CA"), took place in April 2008 with
the CPN-M winning the largest percentage of votes.35 In May
2008 the CA voted to abolish the monarchy and declared Nepal a
secular republic.36 On August 15, 2008 Prachanda, leader of the
effect provided the incentive for the demoralized and divided political parties to come
together into a new Seven Party Alliance.. . ."); ADVOCACY FORUM & HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, supra note 23, at 11 ("[T] he political parties represented in parliament that had
established a Seven-Party Alliance (SPA) initiated a dialogue with the CPN-M with the
help of India.").
31. 12-Point Understanding Reached between the Seven Political Parties and Nepal
Communist Party (Maoists), Nov. 22, 2005, available at http://www.unmin.org.np/
downloads/keydocs/12-point%2Ounderstanding-22%2ONov%202005.pdf; see also
Whitfield, supra note 7, at 6.
32. See Whitfield, supra note 7, at 6; ADVOCACY FORUM & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,
supra note 23, at 11 ("On April 24 [2006], the King announced the reinstatement of the
House of Representatives.").
33. Comprehensive Peace Agreement Concluded between the Government of
Nepal and the Communist Party Nepal (Maoist), Nov. 21, 2006, available at
http://www.un.org.np/node/10498 [hereinafter CPA].
34. Id. 3.2, 6.1; Whitfield, supra note 7, at 6 ("The CPA brought a formal end to
the ten year conflict. It provided for the Maoists to enter a transitional government, and
an interim constitution to be put in place, while preparations were made for elections to
a constituent assembly.").
35. Party Wise Result Status, ELECTION COMM'N, NEPAL, (May 9, 2008),
http://www.election.gov.np/reports/CAResults/reportBody.php?selectedMenu=Party%
20Wise%2OResults%2OStatus%28English%29&rand=1295486006; see also ADVOCACY
FORUM & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 23, at 13 (noting that the CPN-M won
thirty-seven percent of the votes).
36. SeeJai S. Singh, From Hindu Monarchy to Secular Republic: Challenges before Nepal's
Consistent Assembly, 65 INDIA Q. 295, 309 (2009) (noting that the Constituent Assembly
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CPN-M, was selected by his colleagues to become the first elected
prime minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal.37
Following disputes about the integration of former Maoist
fighters into the military, Prachanda resigned as prime minister
on May 4, 2009, and the CPN-M went into opposition.38 Three
weeks after Prachanda's resignation, a new government was
formed, led by newly elected Prime Minister Madhav Kumar
Nepal and his twenty-two-party coalition.39 Several weeks before
the May 28, 2010 deadline for writing a new constitution, Maoist
protesters organized a nationwide strike and called for Prime
Minister Nepal's resignation.' Even though the Maoists
eventually called off the strike4' and the parties agreed to extend
the deadline for writing a new constitution by another year,
("CA") passed a resolution declaring Nepal "'a Secular, Federal, Democratic, Republic
Nation"'); see also Somini Sengupta, Nepal Poised for Rebirth as a Republic, N.Y. TIMES, May
29, 2008, at A8.
37. See ADVOCACY FORUM & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 23, at 14; The
Maobaadi Prime Minsiter, HIMAL SOUTHASIAN, Sept. 2008, available at
http://www.himalmag.com/component/content/article/861-the-maobaadi-prime-
minister.html (noting that Prachanda "was overwhelmingly voted in by his colleagues"
to become prime minister).
38. See Demonstration Effect: Nepal's Political Stalemate, ECONOMIST, Sept. 19, 2009, at
54.
39. See id. (noting that Mr. Nepal's twenty-two party coalition was fragile); see also
Nepal: The Maosit-non-Maoist Polarisation, HIMAL SOUTHASIAN, June 2010, available at
http://www.himalmag.com/component/content/article/182-nepal-the-maoist-non-
maoist-polarisation.html ("[I]n May 2009, 22 out of the 25 parties in the Constituent
Assembly were able to cobble together an unwiedly and inefficient coalition.").
40. Kiran Chapagain & Jim Yardley, Nationwide Strike in Nepal Threatens Final Steps of
Peace Process, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2010, at A9 ("Tens of thousands of Maoist protesters in
Nepal began an indefinite nationwide strike . .. paralizing much of the coutnry and
demanding the resignation of the prime minister, as a deepening political impasse
threatened to unravel the peace process in this Himalayan nation."); Bidushi Dhungel,
Polarised Polity, HIMAL SOUTHASIAN, June 2010, available at http://www.himalmag.com/
component/content/article/48/206-polarised-polity.html ("With political consensus
proving elusive, and the peace process moving at a slow crawl, matters came to a head in
early May, as the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) enforced an 'indefinite
countrywide strike.' The stated intention was to pressure Prime Minsiter Madhav Kumar
Nepal to resign...."); Himalayan Precipice; Nepal, ECONOMIST, May 8, 2010, at 43
("[O]n May 4th, tens of thousands [of Maoist protesters] formed a human chain around
both sides of the 27km (17-mile) ring road, surrounding and cutting of the capital.") .
41. See Dhungel, supra note 40 ("It was only on 8 May, after six days of complete
paralysis, that the party called off the blockade, caving to pressure from the
international community and a countrywide public outcry at the devastating economic
and social impact."); Kiran Chapagain & Jim Yardley, Maoists End Strike in Nepal, Short of
Goal of Forcing the Government to Resign, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2010, at A4 ("Nepal's Maoists
ended their general strike on Friday after crippling the nation for six days . . . .") .
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Nepal resigned as prime minister on June 30, 2010.2 With the
legislature divided and rival leaders vying for power, it took
sixteen rounds of voting-and until February 3, 2011-before
Jhalanath Khanal was elected prime minister;43 this was only after
Prachanda withdrew himself as a prime minister candidate and
supported Khanal."
Beyond the political instability, there is concern-fueled by
Maoist rhetoric that includes statements that the revolution is not
yet over and continues to refer to the "people's republic"-that
the Maoists are not committed to the peace process and are
instead interested in one-party rule.45 The Maoists claim this
language is necessary to assuage the party cadre.46 The youth
wing of the CPN-M, known as the Young Communist League
("YCL"), is accused of continued thuggery and political
intimidation throughout Nepal.4 7 There are fears that the YCL
42. Kiran Chapagain & Jim Yardley, Nepal's Parliament Fails in 5th Try to Select Prime
Minsiter, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2010, at A8; Nepal: Peace, Government and Constitution,
HIMAL SOUTHASIAN, Sept. 2010, available at http://www.himalmag.com/component/
content/article/58/283-nepal-peace-government-and-constitution.html.
43. Kiran Chapagain & Jim Yardley, Nepal Selects a Premier, Ending a Stalemate, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 4, 2011, at Al0.
44. See id.
45. See Chapagain & Yardley, supra note 43 ("There are also stark difference
between the Maoists and other parties over the constitution, with some rival politicians
accusing the Moaists of trying to subvert the peace process to weaken institutions that
would support a multiparty democracy."); Dhungel, supra note 40 (noting that the
Maoists said the May 2010 nationwide strike was bring the "revolution" back and
terming it "Jana Andolan 3"); PrashantJha, Polarised Spring, HIMAL SOUTHASIAN, Apr.
2009, available at http://www.himalmag.com/component/content/article/54/488-
Polarised-spring.html ("[N]on-Maoists accuse[] the Maoists of authoritarian, if not
totalitarian, ambitions and wanting to establish one-party rule); Two Armies into One
Won't Go: Nepal's Political Crisis, ECONOMIST, May 9, 2009, at 15 ("[The Maoists] still talk
(amongst themselves, at least) about a totalitarian-sounding 'people's republic.'").
46. See How Fierce Will the Maoists Be Now?: Nepal's Political Crisis, ECONOMIST, May 9,
2009, at 43 ("Yet Maoist leaders also hint that their virulent rhetoric is to placate their
frustrated rank-and-file."); Jha, supra note 45 ("[The Maoists] urge interlocutors to
understand that the prime minister's paper and occasional radical rhetoric about how
the 'revolution is not yet over' is necessary in order to please the party cadre, who have
been told that the Maoists have achieved a major political victory but are yet to see
changes on the ground.").
47. See How Fierce Will the Maoists Be Now?, supra note 46 (noting the worries about
the Maoist's "storm-trooping youth wing"); Harald Olav Skar, The Red Guard of Nepal,
HIMAL SOUTHASIAN, Sept. 2008, available at http://himalmag.com/component/
content/article/48/860-the-red-guard-of-nepal.html (examining the Young Communist
League ("YCL")); NAT'L HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N NEPAL, SUMMARY OF THE REPORT ON
THE STATUS OF HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER THE COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT (2007),
available at http://www.nhrcnepal.org/publication/doc/reports/Summaryo200f%
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will engender other youth-driven paramilitary-like organizations
in Nepal.48 Furthermore, Nepal is plagued by general lawlessness
and a lack of security, which sometimes leads ordinary people to
enforce the law themselves. Various groups or villages call bandhs
(strikes) that shut down businesses, schools, and roads.49
Additionally, the Maoists have allegedly threatened journalists,
human rights defenders, and community leaders, effectively
silencing them out of fear of retaliation.50
5. Nepal's Human Rights Situation during and after the
Internal Conflict
It is estimated that over 13,000 people, including many
civilians, were killed during Nepal's internal conflict, which
lasted from 1996 until 2006.51 In the aggregate, the state was
20the%20report%20i2-.pdf (alleging that the YCL is responsible for abductions,
beatings, property seizure, and extortion).
48. See Skar, supra note 47 ("One way or another, the strength and pervasiveness of
the YCL in almost all civil-society affairs has become a national issue, especially as it
engenders copycat organisations in the other parties."). See generally Harald Olav Skar,
Between Boy Scouts and Paramilitary Storm Troops: The Young Communist League of Nepal
(Norwegian Inst. of Int'l Aff., Working Paper No. 739, 2008) (providing a history of
Nepal's YCL and other YCLs).
49. See Kanak Mani Dixit, State of the Maoist State, HIMAL SOUTHASIAN, May 2009,
available at http://himalmag.com/component/content/article/77/730-State-of-the-
Maoist-state.html (arguing that the absence of government leads to the inability to
control bandhs); False Start: Nepal's Fragile New Government, ECONOMIST, June 20, 2009, at
41 (noting how the YCL essentially closed Kathmandu when it called a bandh after it
accused the Unified Marxist-Leninist youth faction of murdering one its leaders);Joshua
Gross, Dark Side of Democracy: Chaos and Anarchy Set Loose in Post-Conflict Nepal,
GLOBALPOST, Oct. 20, 2009, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/study-abroad/
091019/dark-side-democracy ("A bandh-from the Hindi word for 'closed'-can spark
from a strike over wages, a political party sending a message or a village demanding
restitution in the aftermath of an auto accident."); see also supra note 40 (discussing the
May 2010 nationwide strike called by the Maoists).
50. Dixit, supra note 49 ("A culture of silence is taking over ... as Maoists and
former-Maoists goons throttle journalists, human rights defenders, community leaders,
and local politicians."); Jha, supra note 45 (noting that violent incidents have created a
"culture of silence").
51. ADVOCACY FORUM & HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 23, at 3; HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, Nepal's Civil War: The Conflict Resumes (Briefing Paper 2005), available at
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/english/docs/2006/03/28/nepal13078_txt.htm
[hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, The Conflict Resumes] (noting that the Informal
Sector Service Center recorded over 8000 mostly civilian deaths since November 2001);
Number of Victims Killed by State and Maoist in Connection with the "People's War" 13 Feb
1996-31 Dec 2006, INFORMAL SECTOR SERV. CTR. [INSEC], http://www.insec.org.np/
pics/1247467500.pdf (calculating that a total of 13,347 people were killed from
February 13, 1996 until December 31, 2006). Nepal's estimated population in July 2010
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responsible for almost double the number of killings committed
by the Maoists, but both were responsible for the deaths of
thousands of people.52 Both sides also commonly practiced
enforced disappearances.5 3 From 2003 to 2004, Nepal recorded
the highest number of new cases of enforced disappearances in
the world.54  In total, approximately 1700 enforced
disappearances were reported during the conflict, of which about
1300 were allegedly committed by the state and its security
forces.55
Another widely practiced human rights violation was the
torture of detainees. Nepal's National Human Rights
Commission reported in 2003 that nearly seventy percent of
people arrested by state authorities were likely to be tortured.56
was just under 29,000,000. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WORLD FACTBOOK 2010, at
452 (2010).
52. See INSEC, supra note 51 (reporting that the state killed 8377 people and the
Maoists killed 4970 people).
53. An enforced disappearance is
considered to be the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of
deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons
acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed
by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by the concealment of
the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such a person
outside the protection of the law.
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance, G.A. Res. 61/177, art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/177 (Jan. 12, 2007)
[hereinafter Disappearance Convention]; see also Declaration on the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearance, G.A. Res. 47/133, art. 1(2), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/47/133 (Dec. 18, 1992) ("[An enforced disappearance] constitutes a violation
of the rules of international law guaranteeing, inter alia, the right to recognition as a
person before the law, the right to liberty and security of the person and the right not to
be subjected to torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment. It also violates or constitutes a grave threat to the right to life.").
54. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm'n on Human Rights,
Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, Civil and Political Rights,
Including the Questions of Disappearances and Summary Executions: Question of Enforced or
Involuntary Disappearances, 1 227, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/58 (Jan. 21, 2004); see also
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CLEAR CULPABILITY: "DISAPPEARANCES" BY SECURITY FORCES IN
NEPAL 24 (2005) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CLEAR CULPABILITY] (noting that
the number of disappearances rose dramatically during the state of emergency and
increased even more after the breakdown of a ceasefire in August 2003).
55. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CLEAR CULPABILITY, supra note 54, at 29 (noting
that in most disappearances documented by Human Rights Watch, the person
disappeared was last seen in the custody of government security forces); HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, The Conflict Resumes, supra note 51.
56. See NAT'L HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N NEPAL, HUMAN RIGHTS IN NEPAL: A STATUS
REPORT 2003, at 35 (2003).
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Despite having fewer claims of torture leveled against them, the
Maoists faced similar allegations.57 Common methods of torture
in Nepal include, inter alia, beating the soles of the feet,
administering electric shocks, burning cigarettes on the victim,
depriving the victim of food and drink, and blindfolding.58
Finally, the Maoists were also accused of using, and sometimes
forcibly recruiting, children for military purposes. In 2003, the
Asian Human Rights Commission estimated that children
composed up to thirty percent of the Maoist forces.59
Despite some improvement in the human rights situation
since the end of the internal conflict, many human rights
violations continue. In July 2007, Nepal's National Human Rights
Commission ("Commission") reported that there was little
improvement in the human rights situation since February
2007.60 From February 2007 until July 2007, the Commission
received 726 complaints, which included 141 related to
abduction and disappearance, 140 related to torture and
mistreatment, and 102 related to killings. 61 In its 2008-2009
annual report, which includes data from July 2007 to June 2008,
the Commission listed 127 complaints for abduction, 127 for
disappearance, 163 for torture, and 249 for killings. 62 While the
numbers suggest that fewer human rights violations have
occurred since the signing of the CPA than during the internal
conflict, violations still continue at alarming rates.
Nepal's recent history, including the continuation of human
rights violations and threats to peace and democracy after the
signing of the CPA, exemplifies the challenges that transitional
governments need to overcome. The next Section explores some
57. See id. at 36 ("As for the Maoists, while their numbers are quite low ...
compared to the number of the State authorities, the victims of torture by Maoists
increased to an overwhelming 180 in the year 2002.").
58. See id.
59. Children and the People's War in Nepal: 146 Children Killed, 2000 Orphaned, 4000
Recruited and 4000 Homeless, ASIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N, (Jan. 22, 2003),
http://acr.hrschool.org/mainfile.php/01 11/55.
60. See NAT'L HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N NEPAL, supra note 47 (finding that killings,
abductions, beatings, and other human rights violations continued to occur throughout
Nepal).
61. See id.
62. See NAT'L HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N NEPAL, ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT JULY
2007-JUNE 2008, at 11 (2008).
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of the established mechanisms transitional states can implement
to deal with their troubled pasts.
B. Transitional Justice
Transitional justice refers to the processes and mechanisms
by which a society in transition addresses past large-scale human
rights violations in order to lay a foundation for sustained peace,
democracy, and justice.63 A society in transition is usually one
going from conflict or authoritarian rule (during which human
rights violations occurred) to the ultimate goals of establishing
and strengthening peace or democracy.64
Transitional justice has its roots in the prosecutions of Nazi
war criminals at the Nuremberg trials following World War 11.65 It
was not until the 1970s, however, that scholars began paying
more attention to transitional justice, in part because of the large
63. See U.N. Secretary-General, General on the Rule of Law and Transitional justice in
Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies: Rep. of the Secretary-General, 8, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616
(Aug. 23, 2004) (defining transitional justice as "the full range of processes and
mechanisms associated with a society's attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-
scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve
reconciliation"); Louis Bickford, Transitional justice, in 3 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
GENOCIDE AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANIlY 1045 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2004) (noting that
societies use transitional-justice activities "in order to build a more democratic, just, or
peaceful future"); Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, TransitionalJustice as Ordinary justice,
117 HARV. L. REV. 761, 768 (2004) (noting that a transition must be "consistent with ...
democratic commitments"); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The New Landscape of Transitional
justice, in TRANSITIONALJUSTICE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: BEYOND TRUTH VERSUS
JUSTICE 1, 2 (Naomi Roth-Arriaza & Javier Mariezcurrena eds., 2006) (noting that
transitional justice practices follow a period of conflict, civil strife or repression).
64. See Bickford, supra note 63, at 1046 (noting that transition "refers to a major
political transformation, such as regime change from authoritarian or repressive rule to
democratic or electoral rule or a transition from conflict to peace or stability"); Eirin
Mobekk, TransitionalJustice in Post-Conflict Societies-Approaches to Reconciliation, in AFTER
INTERVENTION: PUBLIC SECURIlY MANAGEMENT IN POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES: FROM
INTERVENTION TO SUSTAINABLE LOCAL OWNERSHIP 261, 261 (Anja H. Ebnather &
Philipp H. Fluri eds., 2005) ("Transitional justice mechanisms are created to deal with
crimes that were committed during a conflict period, at a stage where that society is at
the cusp of a transition from a society of conflict to one of democracy and peace.").
65. See TRICIA D. OLSEN ET AL., TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN BALANCE: COMPARING
PROCESSES, WEIGHING EFFICACY 3 (2010); Bickford, supra note 63, at 1046; see also David
M. Crane, "Back to the Future"-Reflections on the Beginning of the Beginning:
International Criminal Law in the Twenty-First Century, Address at the Fordham
International Law Journal Symposium: Transitional Justice: War Crimes Tribunals and
Establishing the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Countries, in 32 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1761,
1765 (2009) ("The jurisprudence considered at Nuremberg has been realized and has
expanded to address the myriad of issues facing the atrocities of today and the future.").
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number of transitioning states that employed transitional justice
mechanisms.66 That parties have used these mechanisms in such
diverse geographical, cultural, and religious settings
demonstrates that the mechanisms must be flexible in order to
address the specific context, needs, and limitations of each
transitioning society.6 7 This Section examines the general goals
and three main mechanisms of transitional justice-truth
commissions, prosecutions, and reparations-and concludes by
identifying the goals of transitional justice that Nepalis have
determined to be the most important.
1. Goals of Transitional Justice
Despite the nuances of each situation, there are common
goals that characterize transitional justice. One set of goals is
backward-looking 68 and includes achieving justice for victims and
society through accountability and, sometimes, punishment.
Justice is based on ethical and societal norms that suggest crimes
should not go unpunished and that perpetrators, including the
state itself, should be held accountable for their illegal actions. 69
66. See Bickford, supra note 63, at 1046 ("[T]he transitional justice framework
gained coherence in the last two-and-a-half decades of the twentieth century, especially
beginning with the trials of the former members of the militaryjuntas in Greece (1975)
and Argentina (1983) . .. ."). See generally David Backer, Cross-National Comparative
Analysis, in ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: CHALLENGES FOR
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 23, 25-26 (Hugo van der Merwe et al. eds., 2009) (listing states in
political transition from 1974-2008 that could "permit or induce increased scrutiny of
past injustices"). Well-known early examples of transitioning states include Greece
(1974) and Argentina (1983); more recent examples include Chile (1990), El Salvador
(1992), South Africa (1994), and Liberia (2003). See Backer, supra, at 25-26.
67. See Miriam J. Aukerman, Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crime: A Framework for
Understanding Transitional justice, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 39, 46 (2002) ("Transitional
justice must reflect the needs, desires, and political realities of the victimized
society.. . ."); David A. Crocker, Reckoning with Past Wrongs: A Normative Framework, 13
ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 43, 44, 63 (1999); Neil J. Kritz, Where We Are and How We Got Here:
An Overview of Developments in the Search for Justice and Reconciliation, in THE LEGACY OF
ABUSE: CONFRONTING THE PAST, FACING THE FUTURE 21, 22 (Alice H. Henkin ed., 2002)
("Every national case has unique historical and cultural qualities and must select and
adapt models that are most appropriate to its circumstances . . . .").
68. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 63, at 766 (stating that scholars generally see
transitional justice as backward-looking in that it seeks to punish wrong-doers,
compensate victims, and reveal the truth about the past).
69. See Aukerman, supra note 67, at 53-57 (exploring approaches to punishment);
Crocker, supra note 67, at 53 ("Ethically defensible treatment of past wrongs requires
that those individuals and groups responsible for past crimes be held accountable and
receive appropriate sanctions or punishment.").
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When achieved through holding perpetrators accountable,
justice can also deter and prevent future crimes by demonstrating
to would-be violators that their actions will not go unpunished.70
If paired with reparations, justice attempts to return victims to
their pre-injury state. 7 Another backward-looking goal is
uncovering and exposing the truth about what human rights
violations occurred and by and against whom they were
committed. When publicly disseminated, the truth empowers and
provides closure to victims and creates an accurate record of the
past.72 It can also prevent a recurrence of violations. 3 Some
scholars argue that without the truth component, no other goals
of transitional justice can be realized.74
Justice and truth, the backward-looking goals of transitional
justice, are the foundation on which the forward-looking, longer-
term goals are built-and include creating sustainable peace and
fostering democracy.75 Key to obtaining these goals is establishing
a clear demarcation between the pre-transition and the
transitioning/post-transition regime.76 To separate itself from its
predecessor, some argue that the new government must combat
impunity and promote respect for the rule of law.77 The new
70. See Aukerman, supra note 67, at 63 (exploring the concept of deterrence).
71. See id. at 77 (noting that a purpose of restorative justice is to "repair injuries to
victims"); Crocker, supra note 67, at 57 ("One way of reckoning with past wrongs is by
"righting" them-by restoring victims to something approaching their status quo
ante.").
72. See Crocker, supra note 67, at 49 ("To meet the challenge of reckoning with
past atrocities, a society should investigate, establish, and publicly disseminate the truth
about them."); Roht-Arriaza, supra note 63, at 4 (arguing that "closure" is important for
both individual victims and "whole traumatized societies"); see also infra notes 91-92 and
accompanying text (explaining how truth commissions can foster empathy and a shared
sense of history, and empower victims).
73. Indep. Expert to Update the Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion
of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity, Rep. of the Indep. Expert to Update
the Set of Principles to Combat Impunity, Human Rights Comm'n, at 7, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1 (Feb. 8, 2005) (by Diane Orentlicher) [hereinafter Principles
to Combat Impunity] ("Full and effective exercise of the right to the truth provides a vital
safeguard against the recurrence of violations.").
74. See Crocker, supra note 67, at 50.
75. See Bickford, supra note 63, at 1045 (suggesting that the purpose of transitional
justice activities is "to build a more democratic, just, or peaceful future"); see also Posner
& Vermeule, supra note 63, at 766.
76. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 63, at 765 ("Every transition creates a divide
between the old regime and the new regime.").
77. See Crocker, supra note 67, at 56 ("Rule of law is especially important in a new
and fragile democracy bent on distinguishing itself from prior authoritarianism,
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government must reform or create state institutions and remove
perpetrators of human rights violations from positions of
power.78 The state must also take proactive steps to prevent
future turmoil, including promoting reconciliation between the
parties involved in the previous conflict or between certain
parties that are likely to engage in future conflict.79 In
combination, these steps are necessary to prevent human rights
violations from occurring again and to allow peace and
democracy to take root.
How a transitioning society prioritizes these goals will
depend on which societal actors (e.g., government,
nongovernmental organizations, international bodies) make the
decisions, as well as on factors including culture, history, and
religion.80
2. The Mechanisms of Transitional Justice
To achieve the objectives of transitional justice, states can
employ several different mechanisms. While an in-depth analysis
of these mechanisms is beyond the scope of this work, an
introduction to each is necessary to understand the components
institutionalized bias, or the 'rule of the gun.'"). See generally U.N. Secretary-General,
supra note 63, 1 6 ("[The rule of law] refers to a principle of governance in which all
persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are
accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently
adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and
standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of
supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the
application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal
certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.").
78. See Crocker, supra note 67, at 59 (arguing that a society cannot make a
sustainable transition unless it reforms basic institutions, including "the judiciary, police,
military, land tenure system, tax system, and the structure of economic opportunities").
79. See Mobekk, supra note 64, at 262-64 (arguing that "reconciliation is the
ultimate objective in all post-conflict societies" and discussing the difference between
national and individual reconciliation); Crocker, supra note 67, at 60 (discussing
different meanings of reconciliation, such as simple coexistence, respect among
adversaries, forgiveness, mercy, mutual healing, and harmony).
80. See Aukerman, supra note 67, at 93 (noting that religion will affect the choices a
society makes about transitional justice); Crocker, supra note 67, at 47 ("To fashion and
evaluate any particular tool to reckon with past evil in a particular society and to
combine it with other tools requires not only knowledge of that society's historical
legacies and current capabilities but also a grasp of morally important goals and
standards of assessment."); Kritz, supra note 67, at 22.
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of a comprehensive transitional justice program. This Section
focuses on truth commissions, prosecutions, and reparations.
a. Truth Commissions
Truth commissions aim to uncover the facts about injustices
under a prior regime and are directly linked to the goal of
truth.81 Since the 1970s, dozens of truth commissions have been
established in states all over the world.82
Truth commissions are independent investigative bodies
charged with establishing a record of the past, with a particular
emphasis on human rights violations, that (1) is impartial and
accurate83 and (2) reconciles competing views of the past that
might perpetuate conflict between various societal groups.84
Created either by a branch of the government or by the signing
of a peace agreement,85 these commissions are temporary.86 A
mandate determines the commission's methods of operation, as
well as the specific violations and time period under
investigation; the focus is on general truth, which concerns the
81. See supra notes 72-74 (explaining how truth is a foundational, backward-
looking goal of transitional justice).
82. See Backer, supra note 66, at 35-38 (listing fifty-eight truth commissions
following political transitions from 1977; the list excludes some commissions such as
"intergovernmental inquiries that have a narrow focus and operational mandate or are
initiated without local approval or involvement" and truth commissions operating in
established democracies); U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 63, 1 50 (noting that more
than thirty truth commissions have been established, but not indicating a date from
which this statistic is measured).
83. See Mark Freeman & Priscilla B. Hayner, Truth-Telling, in RECONCILIATION
AFTER VIOLENT CONFLICT 122, 125 (David Bloomfield et al. eds., 2003) (" [Truth
commissions] can establish a record of the past that is accurate, detailed, impartial and
official."); Kritz, supra note 67, at 41 (noting that truth commissions are officially
sanctioned); Mobekk, supra note 64, at 267 ("[Truth commissions] are established and
given authority by the local governments or international organisations . . . .").
84. Kritz, supra note 67, at 37 (noting that in some places, as was the case in Bosnia,
multiple truths might exist after a conflict).
85. See Freeman & Hayner, supra note 83, at 129; see also CPA, supra note 33, 1 5.2.5
("Both sides agree to set up with mutual consent a High-level Truth and Reconciliation
Commission in order to probe into those involved in serious violation of human rights
and crime against humanity in course of the armed conflict for creating an atmosphere
for reconciliations in the society."); cf Mobekk, supra note 64, at 267 (adding that in
some instances truth commissions are established by international organizations).
86. See Freeman & Hayner, supra note 83, at 125 (noting that truth commissions
usually operate for only one or two years); U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 63, 1 50.
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whole of society, as opposed to truth for specific individuals.87
Some truth commissions focus on all human rights violations
during a particular time period, while others focus on specific
types of human rights violations.88
A critical element of truth commissions is that they are
nonjudicial, which means that they cannot determine culpability,
punish perpetrators, or have their recommendations enforced.89
Despite these limitations, truth commissions can support the
work of prosecutions, if prosecutions are part of the transitional
justice program, by gathering evidence and collecting witness
testimony.90
In addition to deciphering and exposing the truth and, in
some circumstances, supporting prosecutions, truth commissions
can also advance the goal of national reconciliation. The truth
commission process fosters empathy and a sense of shared history
by providing an avenue to disclose the suffering borne by
individuals on both sides of a conflict.91 Similarly, by allowing
them a space in which to share their stories, truth commissions
can empower and strengthen victims.9 2
Truth commissions differ in their outcomes and success.
While most have issued final reports (with varying degrees of
87. See Freeman & Hayner, supra note 83, at 122, 125 (arguing that truth
commissions are more useful for national or political reconciliation than for individual
reconciliation); Mobekk, supra note 64, at 266 ("[B]ecause a truth commission tracks
the overall general pattern of human rights abuse ... , the focus and outcome is more
that of national reconciliation.").
88. See Backer, supra note 66, at 35-38 (identifying the focus of inquiry of various
truth commissions since 1977).
89. See Freeman & Hayner, supra note 83, at 123 ("[Truth commissions] have no
power to put anyone in prison, they cannot enforce their recommendations and most
have not even had the power to compel anyone to come forward to answer questions.");
Mobekk, supra note 64, at 267 ("A truth commission cannot determine culpability of the
individual, and it cannot punish or sanction perpetrators of human rights abuses.").
90. See Freeman & Hayner, supra note 83, at 125; Kritz, supra note 67, at 43
(explaining that trials for crimes against humanity require evidence that these acts were
widespread and systematic and that truth commissions, because of their extensive work,
can be useful in showing such trends).
91. See Freeman & Hayner, supra note 83, at 126 (noting that tolerance and
understanding can come from hearing about others' grievances and suffering); see also
Mobekk, supra note 64, at 266 ("Reconciliation, as truth, is central to truth
commissions.").
92. See Freeman & Hayner, supra note 83, at 134 (noting that public hearings of
victim testimony can lead to formal acknowledgment of past wrongs and an
understanding and sympathy for the victim).
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effectiveness, as measured by the implementation of their
recommendations93 ), a few have prematurely disbanded.94
Despite this mixed record, states continue to use them during-
and after-their transitions. 95
b. Prosecutions
A second mechanism used in transitional justice is
prosecutions.96 Prosecuting perpetrators of human rights
violations allows a new government to demonstrate commitment
to the rule of law and a desire to counter the culture of impunity,
both of which promote public confidence in the state's
willingness to enforce the law and may also increase the
judiciary's credibility.97 To demonstrate a distinction from the
previous regime-which presumably allowed human rights
violations to go unpunished-and to be effective, meaningful,
and legitimate, the state must uphold standards of due process in
its prosecutions.98 Legitimizing justice through state mechanisms
is also likely to mitigate the chances of vigilante justice; when
victims and aggrieved groups believe that the state is committed
to achieving justice, they are less likely to seek justice by their
93. See id. at 137 ("[T]he implementation of recommendations has frequently been
a major shortcoming for truth commissions .... ").
94. See Backer, supra note 66, at 35-38 (listing the outcomes of various truth
commissions from 1977 until 2007).
95. See Freeman & Hayner, supra note 83, at 138 (noting the skepticism of truth
commissions' universal application, but also highlighting contributions made by past
truth commissions).
96. See CPA, supra note 33, 7.1.3 ("Both sides express their commitment that
impartial investigation shall be carried out and lawful action would be taken against
individuals responsible for obstructions in the exerciese of the rights contained in the
agreement and guarantee not to encourage impunity.").
97. See U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 63, 39 ("Criminal trials can also
contribute to greater public confidence in the State's ability and willingness to enforce
the law."); Kritz, supra note 67, at 25 (arguing that trials replace a culture of impunity
with a culture of accountability and "provide an important opportunity to establish the
credibility of a previously compromised or non-functioning judicial system"); Mobekk,
supra note 64, at 277 (arguing that not holding perpetrators accountable signals "that
impunity and not the rule of law reigns"); Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The
Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2542
(1991) (arguing that trials can inspire societies to affirm the principle of the rule of
law); see also supra note 77 and accompanying text (noting that in order for the forward-
looking goals of transitional justice to be realized, the new government must combat
impunity and promote respect for the rule of law).
98. SeeAukerman, supra note 67, at 48-49 ("[1If prosecutions are undertaken, they
must comport with accepted standards of due process.").
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own means. 9 Finally, prosecutions are important for societal
reconciliation,100 and they are especially critical for individual
victims for whom prosecutions provide justice, security, and an
opportunity to assert their dignity."o"
In the transitional justice context, prosecutions face unique
limitations. The judicial infrastructure of societies in transition
may be weakened, underdeveloped, or nonexistent. 0 2
Exacerbating the problems posed by a weak judicial system is the
likelihood that the number of perpetrators facing trial would
overwhelm even a well-functioning judiciary. 0 3 Prosecutions by a
regime that recently gained power can be perceived by some as
politically motivated or unfair if they are directed at only
opposition parties or if the governing regime fails to investigate
itself.104 When prosecutions are pursued, they have the potential
to destabilize a society hanging onto a tenuous peace. 05 Given
this critical concern, transitional governments must strategically
plan prosecution programs, taking into account difficult
99. See Kritz, supra note 67, at 25 ("[Trials] provide some redress for the suffering
of victims and help to curtail the inclination towards vigilante justice."); Posner &
Vermeule, supra note 63, at 792 ("Thus, retroactive justice fulfills the standard
channeling function of legal punishment, which substitutes public and official process
for vigilantism.").
100. See Mobekk, supra note 64, at 270 (suggesting that prosecutions, when used in
conjunction with other transitional justice mechanisms, "will have a greater probability
of achieving the rather large objective of reconciliation, at both the national and
individual levels").
101. See U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 63, 1 39 (arguing that prosecutions can
help victims reclaim their dignity); Kritz, supra note 67, at 25 (noting that trials give a
sense of security to victims); Orentlicher, supra note 97, at 2542 (arguing that trials can
inspire societies to reassert respect for the inherent dignity of individuals).
102. See Kritz, supra note 67, at 35 ("The criminal justice system of every country
emerging from a pattern of mass abuses is compromised and minimally functional, with
severely limited capacity at best."); Orentlicher, supra note 97, at 2596 ("Even a well-
functioning judicial system would be incapable [of prosecuting all those who are
criminally responsible]; much less can this be expected following the wholesale collapse
ofjudicial process.").
103. See Aukerman, supra note 67, at 51 (noting that entire societies can be
implicated in atrocities); Kritz, supra note 67, at 35 ("A systematic pattern of atrocity and
trampling of fundamental rights potentially implicates everyone involved in the system,
however tangentially.").
104. See Orentlicher, supra note 97, at 2596-97 (discussing how Argentina
ultimately granted amnesty to some members of the military out of concerns of political
instability).
105. See Kritz, supra note 67, at 35 ("Attempting to prosecute or purge all those
implicated would be politically destabilizing, economically devastating and logistically
impossible.").
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decisions about whom to prosecute with potentially limited funds
and evidence, and acknowledging the likelihood that it may be
impossible to prosecute all perpetrators.10 6 Some may see such a
strategic approach as unacceptable or as compromising the goal
of providing justice to all victims, but it may be inevitable because
of the limitations.
In part because of these challenges, multiple prosecution
models have emerged in the transitional justice context,
including local, international, or hybrid (using both local and
international elements) trials, and universal jurisdiction. These
different models can be used exclusively or in combination.
Research suggests that criminal prosecutions in transitional
societies occur most often in domestic courts.107 When possible,
local trials are preferred because they can help bolster the
legitimacy of the judiciary and provide a sense of local ownership
to the process.108 In limited cases, when domestic courts have
been unable or unwilling to prosecute perpetrators, international
or hybrid courts have been created. 09 International courts
include the International Criminal Court ("ICC") and the two ad
hoc tribunals of the International Criminal Court for the Former
Yugoslavia ("ICTY") and the International Criminal Court for
Rwanda ("ICTR") created by the Security Council of the United
Nations ("UN") as subsidiary organs." 0 Some states have
106. See U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 63, 46 (arguing that because the vast
majority of perpetrators will never be tried, the prosecutorial policy must be strategic);
Aukerman, supra note 67, at 53 (suggesting that selective prosecutions in the transitional
justice context is inevitable); Kritz, supra note 67, at 35 (arguing that societies faced with
a large number of perpetrators are obligated to make choices and establish levels of
culpability); Orentlicher, supra note 97, at 2598, 2602-03 ("[P]rosecutions by a
transitional government that focused on those most responsible for designing and
implementing a past system of rights violations or on the most notorious crimes would
best comport with common standards ofjustice.").
107. See Backer, supra note 66, at 28-32.
108. See U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 63, 1 40 ("Of course, domestic justice
systems should be the first resort in pursuit of accountability."); Crane, supra note 65, at
1768 ("Justice must be done, first, domestically."); Kritz, supra note 67, at 28 ("If the
goal . .. is the creation of a stable society that can avoid the recurrence of massive
violations, then a robust and credible system ofjustice is essential.").
109. See OHCHR-NEPAL, What is Transitional Justice?, (Apr. 12, 2007),
http://nepal.ohchr.org/en/resources/publications/TJ%20brochureE.pdf (arguing
that international or hybrid courts "should only be considered if domestic courts are
unable or unwilling to conduct effective investigations or prosecutions").
110. See U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 63, 38 (noting that the ITCY and the
ICTR were established by the Security Council); Backer, supra note 66, at 28 (noting that
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combined international and domestic elements to create hybrid
tribunals such as the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia and the Special Panels for Serious Crimes in Timor-
Leste.II' A final model of prosecution is universal jurisdiction, by
which a third-party state prosecutes, in its own domestic courts,
perpetrators of a limited number of the most severe human
rights violations based upon the principles that some crimes are
so grave that they affect the international community and that
every state has an interest in prosecuting them. 12
c. Reparations
A final mechanism used in transitional justice is
reparations." 3 The primary purpose of reparations is for the state
to redress and "right" the wrongs committed-and, where
possible, to return the victim to the status quo ante. 14 There are
five categories of reparations.
The first is restitution, which aims to restore victims to their
original situation before the violation of their rights." 5 Examples
two ad hoc UN tribunals-Yugoslavia and Rwanda-have been operating since the mid-
1990s).
111. See U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 63, 1 38 (noting that the United
Nations has established or contributed to the establishment of various criminal
tribunals, of a variety of institutional models, including mixed tribunals in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Cambodia, and Sierra Leone; a panel in Timor-Leste; the use of
international judges and prosecutors in Kosovo; and an investigatory commission in
Guatemala); Backer, supra note 66, at 28-32.
112. See U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 63, 1 48 ("[T]he universality
principle ... holds that some crimes are so grave that all countries have an interest in
prosecuting them."); Backer, supra note 66, at 32 (noting that at least a dozen countries
have initiated prosecutions for violations committed elsewhere); Kritz, supra note 67, at
29-30 (noting that universal jurisdiction is used for such crimes as genocide, war crimes,
crimes against humanity, torture, disappearances, and terrorism).
113. See Backer, supra note 66, at 41 (listing reparation measures by country).
114. See Crocker, supra note 67, at 57 ("One way of reckoning with past wrongs is
by 'righting' them-by restoring victims to something approaching their status quo
ante."); Pablo de Greiff, justice and Reparations, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS 451,
452 (Pablo de Greiff ed., 2006) (noting that "reparations" is a term "used in a wide
sense to refer to all those measures that may be employed to redress the various types of
harms that victims may have suffered as a consequence of certain crimes").
115. See Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation
for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, 1 19, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/60/147 (Mar. 21, 2006) [hereinafter Basic Principles] ("Restitution should,
whenever possible, restore the victim to the original situation before the gross violations
2011] COMPENSATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 1155
of restitution include restoration of liberty and citizenship,
return of property, and reinstatement of employment.116 The
second category is compensation, which is provided for harms
that can be quantified in economic terms.'17 Such harms might
include physical, mental, or moral injury; lost opportunity and
lost earnings; and costs for medical, psychological, legal, or social
services.118 Rehabilitation is the third category of reparations and
includes measures to provide medical, psychological, legal, or
social services." 9 The fourth category is satisfaction, which can
include the cessation of violence; determinations and disclosure
of the truth concerning past human rights violations; the search
for the disappeared, abducted, or killed; a declaration restoring
dignity, reputation, and rights to victims; public apology and
acknowledgement of responsibility; sanctions against
perpetrators; commemorations of the victims, especially in the
form of memorials; and incorporation of human rights training
into education systems.120 The fifth category of reparations is
guarantees of nonrepetition, which are aimed at preventing the
reoccurrence of human rights violations and conflict.'21 Many of
these guarantees function as institutional reforms. They can
include civilian control of the military and security forces;
compliance with international standards of due process for
civilian and military proceedings; establishment of an
independent judiciary; protection of legal and medical
of human rights law or serious violations of international humanitarian law occurred.");
see also de Greiff, supra note 114, at 452.
116. See Basic Principles, supra note 115, 19; see also de Greiff, supra note 114, at
452.
117. See Basic Principles, supra note 115, 1 20 ("Compensation should be provided
for any economically assessable damage, as appropriate and proportional to the gravity
of the violation and the circumstances of each case, resulting from gross violations of
international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian
law. . . ."); see also Richard Falk, Reparations, International Law, and Global justice: A New
Frontier, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 114, at 478, 483 (suggesting that
compensation rests on the fungibility between money and harm suffered); de Greiff,
supra note 114, at 452.
118. See Basic Principles, supra note 115, 1 20; see also de Greiff, supra note 114, at
452.
119. See Basic Principles, supra note 115, 1 21; see also de Greiff, supra note 114, at
452.
120. See Basic Principles, supra note 115, 1 22; see also de Greiff, supra note 114, at
452.
121. See Basic Principles, supra note 115, 1 23; see also de Greiff, supra note 114, at
452.
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professionals and human rights defenders; provision of human
rights education; observance of codes of conduct and ethical
norms for professionals; promotion of conflict resolution; and
review and reform of state laws to ensure compliance with
international human rights and humanitarian law. 22
Transitional justice has numerous goals and a diverse range
of mechanisms, but which goals are prioritized and which
mechanisms have the potential to be most effective are context
and society specific. Examining how Nepalis evaluate their post-
conflict situation and goals for the future is useful for
considering ways to plan a transitional justice program in Nepal.
3. TransitionalJustice and Nepal
There is limited field research on Nepalis' views towards
transitional justice, but a survey conducted by Advocacy Forum, a
well-regarded Nepali human rights organization, and the
International Center for Transitional Justice, provides some
valuable insight. 23 While not dispositive, it is still illustrative.
As an introductory question to the survey, respondents were
asked to provide a definition ofjustice. The top five answers were
(1) access to justice, (2) prosecution of perpetrators, (3)
compensation, (4) fulfillment of victims' demands, and (5)
finding out the truth about incidents of abuse.124 When asked
what should be done to achieve a sustainable peace in Nepal, the
most chosen answer (26.8%) was promoting coexistence and
reconciliation. 2 5  Other relevant answers include providing
reparations (4.0%), prosecuting perpetrators (3.5%), and
improving justice (2.3%).126
122. See sources cited supra note 121.
123. NEPALI VOICES: PERCEPTIONS OF TRUTH, JUSTICE, RECONCILIATION,
REPARATIONS AND THE TRANSITION IN NEPAL is a survey and report jointly conducted
and published by the International Center for Transitional Justice and Advocacy Forum,
a leading Nepali human rights organization. See generally INT'L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE & ADVOCACY FORUM, NEPALI VOICES: PERCEPTIONS OF TRUTH, JUSTICE,
RECONCILIATION, REPARATIONS AND THE TRANSITION IN NEPAL (2008) [hereinafter
NEPALI VOICES]. The report compiled responses of surveys given to 811 Nepalis. The
sample set came from seventeen of Nepal's seventy-five districts-representing a diverse
mix of genders, occupations, education levels, religions, castes, and ethnics groups. Id. at
Iv.
124. Id. at 26.
125. Id. at 29.
126. Id.
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Respondents were also asked about the mechanisms of
transitional justice. Regarding the primary goal of truth
commissions, finding the truth about the past and providing
justice to victims were the top answers.127 The second and third
most popular answers were providing compensation to victims
and prosecuting persons responsible for human rights violations,
respectively. 128
On prosecutions, a majority (69%) supported holding
domestic trials, while a minority (13%) wanted international
trials.129 Despite the support for domestic trials, over half agreed
or strongly agreed that Nepal's current laws were inadequate for
trials of serious human rights violations.130
Almost every respondent (99%) thought that victims should
receive reparations and most (77%) agreed that the state was the
primary entity responsible for providing reparations.131 Most
(68%) favored reparations to individuals, but a healthy number
(28%) favored community reparations.'32 When asked to
prioritize compensation and prosecutions, 54% either agreed or
strongly agreed that compensation was more important than
trials. 33
The survey confirms that Nepalis are interested in fulfilling
the backward-looking goals of transitional justice: truth and
justice. Additionally, while Nepalis recognize a need for truth
commissions, prosecutions, and reparations, there seems to be
broad agreement that victims of human rights violations should
receive reparations. The international law of remedy provides a
framework around which a reparations program can be built.
C. The International Law ofRemedy
One way to realize the goals of transitional justice is to
provide a remedy for the victims of human rights violations.
Where those violations were committed by the state or state
127. Id. at 33 (noting that each top answer received 19% of the responses).
128. Id. (noting that 16% answered with compensation and 8% with prosecutions).
129. Id. at 38.
130. Id. at 39 (noting that 40% agreed and 16% strongly agreed that current Nepali
laws were inadequate for trials of serious human rights violations).
131. Id. at 45-46.
132. Id. at 46.
133. Id. at 39 (noting that 40% agreed and 14% strongly agreed that compensation
was more important than trials).
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actors, victims will often look to the state for a remedy. But
"remedy" is a broad and vague term. This Section provides a
survey of relevant, contemporary international law concerning
the right to remedy, reparations, and compensation, as espoused
in international and regional instruments and jurisprudence, and
United Nation documents.
1. The Right to Effective Remedy in International and Regional
Instruments
Several international instruments recognize the right to
remedy for human rights violations. The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights states that " [e]veryone has the right to an effective
remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the
fundamental rights." 34 The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights ("ICCPR") states that " [e]ach State Party to the
present Covenant undertakes (a) to ensure that any person
whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall
have an effective remedy."'35 The International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination provides that
"[s]tate Parties shall assure to everyone within their jurisdiction
effective protection and remedies, through the competent national
tribunals and other State institutions, against any acts of racial
discrimination."1 3 6 The Declaration on the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearances, which is a nonbinding
resolution of the UN General Assembly, declares that " [t]he
right to a prompt and effective judicial remedy as a means of
134. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 8, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) (emphasis added).
135. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2(3), Dec. 16, 1966, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976)
[hereinafter ICCPR] (emphasis added). The Human Rights Committee has clarified
that "the Covenant generally leaves it to the States parties concerned to choose their
method of implementation in their territories within the framework set out in that
article." Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 3: Implementation at the
National Level (Art. 2), 13th Sess. (July 29, 1981), reprinted in Compilation of General
Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at
4, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (Vol. I).
136. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination art. 6, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 [hereinafter CERD] (emphasis
added).
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determining the whereabouts or state of health of person
deprived of their liberty .. . is required."137
Some regional instruments also provide for the right to
remedy. The European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights ("European Convention") states that "[e]veryone whose
rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated
shall have an effective remedy before a national authority."138 The
American Convention on Human Rights ("American
Convention") says that "[e]veryone has the right to simple and
prompt recourse, or any other effective recourse, to a competent
court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his
fundamental rights" and that
[t]he States Parties undertake: (a) to ensure that any person
claiming such remedy shall have his rights determined by the
competent authority provided for by the legal system of the
state; (b) to develop the possibilities of a judicial remedy; and
(c) to ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce
such remedies when granted. 39
While the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights
("African Charter") does not use the language of effective
remedy, it essentially provides the same when it states that
"[e]very individual shall have the right to have his cause
heard." 14
2. The Right to Reparations and Compensation in International
and Regional Instruments
Beyond general provisions espousing the right to a remedy,
some instruments provide a specific mandate to international
and regional courts to award reparations and compensation for
human rights violations. The Rome Statute of the ICC is the only
major international instrument that generally discusses
reparations and compensation; it provides that the ICC
137. Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance,
supra note 53, art. 9 (emphasis added).
138. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 13, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention]
(emphasis added).
139. American Convention on Human Rights art. 25, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S.
123 [hereinafter American Convention] (emphasis added).
140. African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights art. 7, June 27, 1981,
OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 [hereinafter African Charter].
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shall establish principles relating to reparations to, or in respect
of victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation.
On this basis, in its decision the Court may, either upon
request or on its own motion in exceptional circumstances,
determine the scope and extent of any damage, loss and
injury to, or in respect of, victims and will state the principles
on which it is acting."'
The right to reparations and compensation is also listed in
several regional instruments. If the European Court of Human
Rights "finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or
the protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High
Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be
made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the
injured party."1 42 Also in Europe, the Council of Europe's
European Convention on the Compensation of Victims of
Violent Crimes provides that
[clompensation shall be paid by the State on whose territory the
crime was committed: (a) to nationals of the States party to
this Convention; (b) to nationals of all member States of the
Council of Europe who are permanent residents in the State
on whose territory the crime was committed."'
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights "shall also rule, if
appropriate, that the consequences of the measure or situation
that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be
remedied and that fair compensation be paid to the injured
party." 44 In its 1998 Protocol to the African Charter, the
Organization of African Unity declared that the African Court on
Human and Peoples' Rights "shall make appropriate orders to
141. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 75(1), July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (emphasis added) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
142. European Convention, supra note 138, art. 41 (emphasis added).
143. European Convention on the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes art.
3, Nov. 24, 1983, Eur. T.S. No. 116 (emphasis added); see also M. Cherif Bassiouni,
International Recognition of Victims' Rights, 6 HuM. RTS. L. REV. 203, 224 (2006) ("The
European Convention on the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes was
established . . . to introduce or develop compensation schemes for victims of violent
crime, in particular when the offender has not been identified or is without
resources.").
144. American Convention, supra note 139, art. 63 (emphasis added).
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remedy the violation, including the payment of fair compensation or
reparation."1 4 5
On an international and regional level, there are some
instruments that call for reparations and compensation for any
human rights violation. Other instruments, however, are more
specific in their formulations and provide compensation only for
specific human rights violations.
3. The Right to Compensation in International and Regional
Instruments for Specific Human Rights Violations
Violations of specific human rights, including illegal arrest
or detention, torture, and miscarriage ofjustice have been found
to warrant compensation. When a person has been illegally
arrested or detained, the ICCPR grants an "enforceable right to
compensation." 4 6 Similarly, if a person has been tortured, the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("CAT") provides that a
state must ensure that a victim "obtains redress and has an
enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation including
the means for as full rehabilitation as possible."'47 Even though
the ICCPR prohibits the use of torture,148 the document itself
does not explicitly require compensation be paid. General
Comment 20 by the Human Rights Commission, however,
interprets the prohibition against torture in conjunction with the
right to an effective remedy, which, it says, includes
"compensation and such full rehabilitation as may be
possible." 49 The ICCPR also provides that that person "shall be
145. Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights art. 27(1), June 9,
1998, OAU Doc. OAU/LEG/MIN/AFCHPR/PROT (III) (emphasis added).
146. ICCPR, supra note 135, art. 9(5) ("Anyone who has been victim of unlawful
arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation.").
147. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment art. 14(1), Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 1465
U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT]. This article also notes that "[i]n the event of the death
of the victim as a result of an act of torture, his dependents shall be entitled to
compensation." Id.
148. See ICCPR, supra note 135, art. 7.
149. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 20: Replaces General
Comment 7 Concerning Prohibition of Torture and Cruel Treatment or Punishment
(Art. 7), 44th Sess. (Mar. 10, 1992), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and
General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, at 33, U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (Vol. I) ("States may not deprive individuals of the right to an
1162 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 34:1131
compensated according to law" for a miscarriage of justice.150
Last, the International Convention for the Protection of All
Persons from Enforced Disappearance gives the victim' 5 ' of
enforced disappearance "the right to obtain reparation and
prompt, fair and adequate compensation."152
There are similar pronouncements in several regional
instruments. When a person has been illegally arrested or
detained, the European Convention grants an "enforceable right
to compensation."15 3 When a person has been wrongly convicted
through a miscarriage of justice, the American Convention
explicitly grants to the right to compensation. 5 4
4. Jurisprudential Standards on the Right to Remedy,
Reparations, and Compensation
This Section provides an overview of some seminal
international and regional cases interpreting the right to remedy,
reparations, and compensation. A review of such cases
demonstrates how courts have interpreted and enforced the
rights outlined in various human rights instruments.
effective remedy, including compensation and such full rehabilitation as may be
possible.").
150. ICCPR, supra note 135, art. 14(6) ("When a person has by a final decision
been convicted of a criminal offence and when subsequently his conviction has been
reversed or he has been pardoned on the ground that a new or newly discovered fact
shows conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice, the person who has
suffered punishment as a result of such conviction shall be compensated according to
law. ). The Human Rights Committee has urged state parties to comply with this
provision because the commission found it "is often not observed or insufficiently
guaranteed by domestic legislation." Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 13:
Equality Before the Courts and the Right to a Fair and Public Hearing by an
Independent Court Established by Law (Art. 14), 21st Sess. (Apr. 13, 1984), reprinted in
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human
Rights Treaty Bodies, at 17, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 (Vol. I).
151. As defined by the Convention, "'victim' means the disappeared person and
any individual who has suffered harm as the direct result of an enforced disappearance."
Disappearance Convention, supra note 53, art. 24(1).
152. Id. art. 24(4).
153. European Convention, supra note 138, art. 5(5) ("Everyone who has been the
victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this article shall have
an enforceable right to compensation.").
154. American Convention, supra note 139, art. 10 ("Every person has the right to
be compensated in accordance with the law in the event he has been sentenced by a
final judgment through a miscarriage ofjustice.").
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A foundational case on reparations is the Factory at
Chorz6w.155 While the legal focus in Chorz6w was a property and
land ownership dispute, human rights scholars have paid much
attention to the Permanent Court of International Justice's
pronouncement on reparations. In its judgment, the court states:
It is a principle of international law that the breach of an
engagement involves an obligation to make reparation in an
adequate form. Reparation therefore is the indispensable
complement of a failure to apply a convention and there is
no necessity for this to be stated in the convention itself.156
The court not only frames reparations as an obligation, but also
grounds the right in customary law.157
Even though not an international court, the Human Rights
Committee ("HRC") has addressed compensation awards. In
Baboeram v. Suriname, a case of Surinamese nationals who were
arrested and murdered by military authorities, the HRC ruled
that the victims were deprived of their right to life as articulated
in Article 6(1) of the ICCPR and urged Suriname to pay
compensation to the surviving families.15 8 Six years later, the
HRC used stronger language in Barbato v. Uruguay, a case in
which the Uruguayan government was found responsible for
violating the right to life of a citizen who died in detention. 59
The HRC found that Uruguay was obligated to take steps "to pay
appropriate compensation to his family" and to bring to justice
those responsible for the victim's death.1so
In the Americas, one of the earliest cases to discuss
compensation is Veldsquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, which was
155. See Factory at Chorz6w (Ger. v. Pol.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 21 (July
26).
156. Id. at 21.
157. See id.; see also Bassiouni, supra note 143, at 230 ("A State's duty to make
reparations for its acts or omissions is well-established in treaty-based and customary
law.").
158. See Baboeram v. Suriname, Commc'n. Nos. 146/1983 & 148-54/1983, 11 15-
16, U.N. Doc. A/40/40, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Annex X (1985) ("The
Committee therefore urges the State party to take effective steps . .. to pay
compensation to the surviving families. . . .").
159. See Barbato v. Uruguay, Commc'n. No. 84/1981, 10(a), U.N. Doc. A/38/40,
U.N. GAOR, 38th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Annex IX (1982) ("[T]he Uruguayan authorities
failed to take appropriate measures to protect [Barbato's] life while he was in
custody.. .. ").
160. See id. I 11.
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decided in 1988 by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
Vehisquez, a student at the National Autonomous University of
Honduras, was detained, tortured, and disappeared by the state
of Honduras.16' The court found that Velisquez's treatment
violated Article 7 (the right to personal liberty), Article 5 (the
right to integrity of the person), and Article 4 (the right to life)
of the American Convention.162 Responsibility was imputed to the
state of Honduras by Article 1(1) of the convention, which
requires state parties to respect the rights of the convention and
ensure that all persons in their jurisdiction have free and full
exercise to those rights.163 The court found that the obligations
to ensure and respect meant that a state must "prevent,
investigate and punish any violation of the rights recognized by
the Convention and, moreover, if possible attempt to restore the
right violated and provide compensation as warranted for
damages resulting from the violation." 164
These cases provide some examples of how, why, and on
what basis various international adjudicative bodies have awarded
reparations and compensation for human rights violations.
Additionally, these cases provide a foundation upon which to set
the right to reparations or compensation as a principle of
international law.
5. UN Documents on the Right to Remedy, Reparations, and
Compensation
In addition to international and regional instruments and
jurisprudence, the UN has formulated and, in some instances,
161. See Velisquez-Rodriguez v. Honduras, Merits and Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, 3, 119, 148 (July 29, 1988).
162. See id. 155-57, 185.
163. See id. 1 169, 180. Responsibility was imputed to the state because evidence is
usually difficult to obtain for disappearances, but the court found that a pattern of
disappearances carried out or tolerated by Honduran officials had been proven. See id. 1
148. Furthermore, Honduras did not carry out serious investigations into the
disappearance of Velsquez-Rodriguez. See id. 180.
164. Id. 1 166. The court allowed the parties to agree on damages, but reserved the
right to award an amount of damages if the parties could not come to an agreement. See
id. 191. When the parties did not come into an agreement, the court intervened and
awarded 750,000 lempiras (500,000 for loss of earnings and 250,000 for moral damages)
to Velasquez's wife and children. See Veldsquez-Rodrfguez v. Honduras, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 7, 1 49, 52 (July 21,
1989).
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adopted several documents concerning remedy, reparations, and
compensation. Even though General Assembly resolutions are
nonbinding, they represent important guidelines.
In 1985, the General Assembly adopted the Declaration of
Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of
Power ("Declaration"). The Declaration states that victims 65 are
entitled to prompt redress in the form of restitution,
compensation, and assistance.'66 Further, the Declaration states
that victims of abuse of power have also suffered harm "through
acts or omissions that do not yet constitute violations of national
criminal laws but of internationally recognized norms relating to
human rights."i6 7 Where such norms-and their remedies-have
not been incorporated into national law, the document
encourages states to do so.1 68
The UN has also set forth Principles for the Protection and
Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat
Impunity ("Principles"). 169 Concerning the right to
reparation/guarantees of nonrecurrence, the Principles state
that "[a]ny human rights violation gives rise to a right to
reparation on the part of the victim or his or her beneficiaries,
implying a duty on the part of the state to make reparation and
165. Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of
Power, G.A. Res. 40/34, 1, U.N. Doc A/RES/40/34 (Nov. 29, 1985) [hereinafter
Declaration] ("'Victims' means persons who . .. have suffered harm ... through acts or
omissions that are in violation of criminal laws operative within Member States . .. .").
166. See id. 11 4, 8-17 ("When compensation is not fully available from the
offender or other sources, States should endeavour to provide financial compensation
to: (a) [v]ictims who have sustained significant bodily injury or impairment of physical
or mental health as a result of serious crimes; (b) [t]he family, in particular dependents
of persons who have died or become physically or mentally incapacitated as a result of
such victimization").
167. Id. 118.
168. Id. 1 19 ("States should consider incorporating into their national law norms
proscribing abuses of power and providing remedies to victims of such abuses. In
particular, such remedies should include restitution and/or compensation, and
necessary material, medical, psychological and social assistance and support."); see also
Dinah Shelton, The United Nations Principles and Guidelines on Reparations: Context and
Contests, in OUT OF THE ASHES: REPARATION FOR VICTIMS OF GROSS AND SYSTEMATIC
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 11, 13 (K. De Feyet et al. eds., 2005) ("Abuse of power that
is not criminal under national law but that violates internationally recognized norms
relating to human rights should be sanctioned and remedies provided. .. ."). But see
Bassiouni, supra note 143, at 217 (arguing that the Basic Principles "are only applicable
in the event that the domestic criminal law of a given State has incorporated the
applicable international human rights or humanitarian norm").
169. Principles to Combat Impunity, supra note 73.
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the possibility for the victim to seek redress from the
perpetrator."17 0 Reparations "include restitution, compensation,
rehabilitation, and satisfaction as provided by international
law." 71 Reparations may come from legislatively created
programs, be funded by the state or international donors, or be
directed at individuals or communities. 7 2
Finally, in 2006, the General Assembly adopted the Basic
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and
Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International
Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law ("Basic Principles"). 173 In its resolution
adopting the Basic Principles, the General Assembly articulated
its recommendation that states take the Basic Principles into
account, promote respect for them, and bring them to the
attention of the executive bodies of their governments. 74 The
Basic Principles are victim-centric, and outline those remedies
available to individuals who are victims of human rights
violations.175 Historically, international law governed actions
between sovereign states. If a state breached an obligation or
170. See Principles to Combat Impunity, supra note 73, princ. 31, pmbl. ("[T]he
following principles are intended as guidelines to assist States in developing effective
measures for combating impunity.").
171. See id. princ. 34.
172. See id. princ. 32.
173. The Basic Principles were formulated over a seventeen-year period separately
by Theo van Boven and M. Cherif Bassiouni as special rapporteurs. See Special
Rapporteur on the Right to Reparations to Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights,
Study Concerning the Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross
Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1-2, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8 (July 2, 1993) (by Theo van Boven) [hereinafter ECOSOC,
Study]; see Special Rapporteur on the Right to Restitution, Compensation and
Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, The Right to Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross
Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1 1-3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/
62 (Jan. 18, 2000) (by M. Cherif Bassiouni). See generally Shelton, supra note 168, at 14-
18.
174. See Basic Principles, supra note 115, 1 2 ("[The General Assembly]
[Iecommends that States take the Basic Principles and Guidelines into account,
promote respect thereof and bring them to the attention of members of the executive
bodies of government, in particular law enforcement officials and military and security
forces, legislative bodies, the judiciary, victims and their representatives, human rights
defenders and lawyers, the media and the public in general. . . .").
175. See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Reparations Decisions and Dilemmas, 27 HASTINGS INT'L
& COMP. L. REV. 157, 164 (2004) (noting that the Basic Principles adopt a "victim-
centered approach").
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duty to another state, the latter was entitled to a remedy by the
former. Contemporary international law, however, has come to
recognize the rights of the individual vis-fi-vis the state.'76 When a
state violates the rights of the individual in breach of
international law, the individual may be entitled to a remedy by
the state. 17 The Basic Principles incorporate this idea; they do
not create new international law, but rather serve as a
comprehensive restatement of existing international law and
state obligations.178 Violations of human rights law provide the
victim the right to equal and effective access to justice; adequate,
effective, and prompt reparation for harm suffered; and access to
relevant information concerning violations and reparations
mechanisms.179
Specifically concerning reparations, the Basic Principles
note that "reparations" is an umbrella term that includes
restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and
guarantees of nonrepetition.180  Reparations should be
proportional to the harm suffered and the state "shall provide
reparation to victims for acts or omissions which can be
attributed to the State and constitute gross violations of
international human rights law."181
176. ECOSOC, Study, supra note 173, 1 45 ("The principle right [victims of
breaches of international human rights law] are entitled to under international law is
the right to effective remedies and just reparations.").
177. See Riccardo Pisillo-Mazzeschi, International Obligations to Provide for Reparation
Claims?, in STATE RESPONSIBILIlY AND THE INDIVIDUAL: REPARATION IN INSTANCE OF
GRAVE VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 149, 151-52 (Albrecht Randelzhofer & Christian
Tomuschat eds., 1999) (noting that the position of the individual in contemporary law is
different from the traditional form of international law that was aimed at preventing and
resolving conflicts among states).
178. See Basic Principles, supra note 115, pmbl. ("Emphasizing that the Basic
Principles and Guidelines contained herein do not entail new international or domestic
legal obligations but identify mechanisms, modalities, procedures and methods for the
implementation of existing legal obligations under international human rights law and
international humanitarian law .... ); see also Roht-Arriaza, supra note 175, at 162-63
("The Principles are intended to restate and gather up existing law and practice, not to
make new law.").
179. See Basic Principles, supra note 115, 111.
180. See id. 11 19-23; see also supra notes 113-22 (providing a detailed description
of the categories of reparations).
181. See Basic Principles, supra note 115, 115.
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6. Nepal's International Legal Obligations and the CPA
Nepal became a member state of the United Nations in
1955.182 Of the international instruments referenced herein,
Nepal has ratified, acceded, and succeeded to CAT,183 the
ICCPR,i84 and the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 85
Nepal's CPA also makes some powerful statements about the
protection of human rights. It provides that "[b]oth sides
reiterate their commitment to the respect and protection of
human rights."' 86 Additionally, the parties agreed "to create an
atmosphere where the Nepali people can enjoy their civil,
political, economic, social and cultural rights and are committed
to ensuring that such rights are not violated under any
circumstances in the future."' 7 Finally, and somewhat vaguely,
the CPA states that both parties will "also guarantee the right to
relief of the families of victims of conflict, torture and
disappearance."' 88 The term "relief' is left undefined.
As Nepal attempts to move away from war and
authoritarianism toward peace and democracy, transitional
justice and international human rights law offer a variety of ways
to bring truth and justice to victims of human rights violations. If
Nepal fails in this regard, peace and democracy remain tenuous.
In deciding which mechanisms to implement, a transitioning
society must not only assess its international legal obligations, but
must also determine its ability to effectively implement a
transitional program. The next Section explores the parameters
182. See S.C. Res. 109, U.N. Doc S/RES/109 (Dec. 14, 1955); G.A. Res. 955(X),
U.N. Doc. A/RES/955(X) (Dec. 14, 1955) (admitting Nepal as a member state to the
United Nations).
183. UN Treaty Collection, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=
TREATY&mtdsg no=IV-9&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Feb. 18, 2011).
184. UN Treaty Collection, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=
TREATY&mtdsg.no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Feb. 18, 2011).
185. UN Treaty Collection, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=
TREATY&mtdsg.no=IV-2&chapter=4&lang=en#EndDec (last visited Feb. 18, 2011)
(making the following relevant reservation: "His Majesty's Government interprets the
requirement in article 6 concerning 'reparation or satisfaction' as being fulfilled if one
or other of these forms of redress is made available; and further interprets 'satisfaction'
as including any form of redress effective to bring the discriminatory conduct to an
end.").
186. CPA, supra note 33, 7.1.1.
187. Id. 7.1.2.
188. Id. 9 7.1.3.
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of the right to individual compensation in international human
rights law and how that right is affected by the unique
circumstances of transitioning states.
II. INDIVIDUAL COMPENSATIONININTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE CONTEXT
Individual compensation poses particular challenges in the
transitional justice context because it requires a financial
commitment from a state that is likely impoverished. In Part II,
this Note focuses on the specific right to individual
compensation. Part II.A addresses the scope of the right to
individual compensation in international law by reviewing
international and regional instruments and jurisprudence and
customary international law. Furthermore, this Section separates
a mandatory right from a discretionary right to individual
compensation-and ultimately determines that, under
international law, not all human rights violations create a right to
individual compensation. Part II.B examines the impact of
individual compensation in the transitional justice context by
highlighting both the benefits and challenges of individual
compensation. Finally, Part II.B discusses the theory of
compensation as development as an alternative paradigm.
A. The Scope of the Remedy: The Right to Individual Compensation in
International Law
The right to remedy has been articulated in international
and regional instruments and jurisprudence. 89 Some scholars
also argue that the right to remedy is a norm of customary
international law, which gives it binding force.190 The scope of
the remedy, however, remains undefined. This Section will
189. See supra Part I.C.1 and I.C.4 (exploring the right to remedy in international
and regional instruments and jurisprudence).
190. See Bassiouni, supra note 143, at 218 ("A survey of contemporary State
practice, as evidenced in the substantive laws and procedures functioning in domestic
legal systems, confirms the duty to provide a remedy to victims."); Stephen Pet6 & Max
du Plessis, Reparations for Gross Violations of Human Rights in Context, in REPAIRING THE
PAST? INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON REPARATIONS FOR GROSS HUMAN RIGHTS
ABUSES 3, 13 (Max du Plessis & Stephen Pet6 eds., 2007) (discussing how the norms of
the Basic Principles are customary law). But see infra Part II.A.3 (suggesting that the right
to individual compensation has not been established as a principle of customary
international law).
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explore the extent to which the right to remedy or reparations
involves an international legal obligation for states to provide
individual compensation for human rights violations. The right
to remedy or reparations is not necessarily the same as the right
to individual compensation; the latter is but one type of the
former. 91 To say that an individual has a right to remedy or
reparation is not to say that he or she necessarily has a right to
individual compensation. Depending on interpretation, remedy
could be as narrow as the right to bring an action before a
judicial body to settle a dispute.192 Conversely, where a specific
remedy is not specified, a broad range of remedies is available to
provide redress to the victim. 93 Some instruments, such as the
ICCPR and the Basic Principles, provide broad parameters
regarding the adequacy of the remedy-for example, that it is
effective 94 or proportional to the harm19 5-but they fail to
provide specific guidance. Similarly, awarding reparations could
mean awarding restitution, compensation, rehabilitation,
satisfaction, or guarantees of nonrepetition.19 6 The question,
therefore, is not whether an individual whose human rights have
been violated by the state has the right to remedy or reparations,
191. See supra notes 117-18 (noting that compensation is one of five categories of
reparations).
192. See Christian Tomuschat, Reparation for Victims of Grave Human Rights
Violations, 10 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 157, 168 (2002) [hereinafter Tomuschat,
Reparation] (suggesting that because the French version of the ICCPR uses the word
recours and the Spanish version uses recurso, the most applicable definition of remedy is a
legal action brought before ajudicial or other body entitled to settle the dispute).
193. See Orentlicher, supra note 97, at 2570 ("[T]he Commission [on Human
Rights] sought to ensure the broadest possible range of remedies for violations of
human rights" contained in the ICCPR when it required only an "effective remedy.");
see also Christian Tomuschat, Individual Reparation Claims in Instances of Grave Human
Rights Violations: The Position under General International Law, in STATE RESPONSIBILITY
AND THE INDIVIDUAL, supra note 177, at 1, 14 [hereinafter Tomuschat, Indiviudal
Reparation] (noting that states can provide reparations to its citizens even when a legal
framework does not exist).
194. See Bassiouni, supra note 143, at 214 ("While the ICCPR does not mandate a
State Party to pursue a specific course of action to remedy the violation of protected
rights, the language of [Article 2(3)] clearly envisages that the remedy is effective, of a
legal nature and enforceable."); supra notes 135, 179 and accompanying text (discussing
the language of remedy in the ICCPR and the Basic Principles).
195. See Basic Principles, supra note 115, 1 15 ("Reparation should be proportional
to the gravity of the violations and the harm suffered.").
196. See supra notes 113-22 (providing a detailed description of the categories of
reparations).
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but rather whether that individual has a right to individual
compensation as a form of remedy or reparations.
1. Mandatory Right to Individual Compensation
The ICCPR and the European Convention provide a
mandatory right to compensation only for unlawful arrest and
detention.197 CAT provides compensation for the family of
torture victims who died as a result of the torture.'98 The UN
Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Enforced
Disappearances provides compensation for disappearance.19 9
These instruments make it clear that there is an international
legal obligation to provide individual compensation in the
particular and specific situations they stipulate.
It is less clear whether there is a mandatory right to
compensation when instruments require domestic
implementation. Internationally, the ICCPR states that
compensation shall be made "according to [the] law" for
miscarriages of justice. 200 CAT mandates that a signatory state
"ensure in its legal system" that torture victims have a right to
compensation. 201 The International Convention for the
197. ICCPR, supra note 135, art. 9(5) ("Anyone who has been the victim of
unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to compensation.");
European Convention, supra note 138, art. 5(5) ("Everyone who has been the victim of
arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this article shall have an
enforceable right to compensation.").
198. See CAT, supra note 147, art. 14(1) ("In the event of the death of the victim as
a result of an act of torture, his dependents shall be entitled to compensation.").
199. Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance,
supra note 53, art. 19 ("The victims of acts of enforced disappearance and their family
shall obtain redress and shall have the right to adequate compensation, including the
means for as complete a rehabilitation as possible. In the event of the death of the victim
as a result of an act of enforced disappearance, their dependents shall also be entitled to
compensation.").
200. ICCPR, supra note 135, art. 14(6) ("When a person has by a final decision
been convicted of a criminal offence and when subsequently his conviction has been
reversed or he has been pardoned on the ground that a new or newly discovered fact
shows conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice, the person who has
suffered punishment as a result of such conviction shall be compensated according to
law."); see also Tomuschat, Reparation, supra note 192, at 167 (arguing that this clause
does not establish an individual right, but invites member states to "enact appropriate
national legislation").
201. CAT, supra note 53, art. 14(1) ("Each State Party shall ensure in its legal
system that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress and has an enforceable right to
fair and adequate compensation, including the means for as full rehabilitation as
possible.").
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Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance
mandates that a signatory state "ensure in its legal system" that
victims of enforced disappearance have the right to
compensation. 202 The rules of the ICTY and the ICTR do not give
these courts the power to award compensation; rather, after
judgment, a victim may bring an action for compensation in a
national court or other competent body "[p]ursuant to the
relevant national legislation." 203 Regionally, the American
Convention grants compensation "in accordance with the law"
for miscarriages of justice. 204 Some may argue that even with this
legislative requirement there is still an international legal
obligation to provide compensation. It could also be interpreted,
however, that for the right to compensation to be available to the
individual, the state must first pass national legislation to that
effect.205
2. Discretionary Right to Individual Compensation
A plain reading of the text of two regional instruments
suggests that the right to compensation is discretionary. In the
European Convention, Article 41 states that the court may award
just satisfaction, which could include compensation for violations
of the convention, "if necessary." 206 The American Convention
grants compensation "if appropriate" for violations of the rights
202. Disappearance Convention, supra note 53, art. 24(4) ("Each State Party shall
ensure in its legal system that the victims of enforced disappearance have the right to
obtain reparation and prompt, fair and adequate compensation.").
203. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, R. 106, U.N. Doc. ITR/3/REV.1 (1995); International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, R. 106, U.N. Doc.
IT/32/REV.7 (2009); see also ILARIA BOTTIGLIERO, REDRESS FOR ViCrIMS OF CRIMES
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAw 200-01 (2004) (discussing Rule 106 of the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence for the Criminal Tribunals in Rwanda and Yugoslavia).
204. American Convention, supra note 139, art. 10.
205. Tomuschat, Individual Reparation, supra note 193, at 10 ("[A]ll of the present-
day human rights treaties, inasmuch as they mention compensation to the benefit of an
individual who has sustained injury, enjoin the State party concerned to enact national
legislation for that purpose.").
206. See European Convention, supra note 138, art. 41 ("If the Court finds that
there has been a violation of the Convention or the protocols thereto, and if the internal
law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made,
the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party."); see also
Tomuschat, Reparation, supra note 192, at 162 ("[The European Court of Human
Rights] does not believe it is obligated to compensate an injured party under all
circumstances. Thus, it enjoys a broad measure of discretion.").
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contained within the convention. 207 Both of these provisions do
not preclude the courts from granting compensation, but nor do
they require that the courts award compensation in all cases as a
right of the individual.
3. Customary International Law Right to Compensation
Even if the right to individual compensation is not
established by international and regional instruments, it could be
a norm of customary international law. It seems, however, that
individual compensation has not yet ripened into customary law
because there has not been a consistently demonstrated pattern
of states awarding compensation to victims of human rights
violations out of a sense of legal obligation.208 There are
examples of states that have paid compensation to victims of
human rights violations, but this is generally done at the state's
initiative, not because the state was mandated to do so by
international enforcement bodies or out of a sense of legal
obligation. 209 Further, compensation is usually paid in situations
where the number of victims is small or the state is wealthy
enough to make the payments. 210 There are also cases in which
domestic bodies have determined that compensation should be
paid, but the state has refused or been unable to make
payment.211 Because there is no consistent pattern demonstrated
207. See American Convention, supra note 139, art. 63 ("If the Court finds that
there has been a violation of a right or freedom protected by this Convention, the
Court ... shall also rule, if appropriate, that the consequences of the measure or
situation that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be remedied and that fair
compensation be paid to the injured party."); see also Tomuschat, Reparation, supra note
192, at 165 ("The phrase 'if appropriate' introduces, once again, a measure of discretion
that allows the court to decide whether compensation should be paid to the victim.").
208. See Tomuschat, Reparation, supra note 192, at 170-71 (arguing that because
victims of human rights violations rarely receive adequate reparation, there is no
international practice to establish a rule of customary law).
209. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 175, at 170-75 (examining the reparations
programs of Albania, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Czechoslovakia, El Salvador, Germany,
Guatemala, Hungary, and South Africa, and noting that in each case it was the state that
decided to implement a reparations program).
210. Id. ("In general, existing reparations programs have involved relatively well-off
countries, or those where there is a limited and easily identifiable set of victims.").
211. Id. at 174-75 (noting that El Salvador and Guatemala have not paid out
reparations even after the state expressed interest in paying reparations); Tomuschat,
Reparation, supra note 192, at 170-73 (examining the case of Guatemala and concluding
that "the great majority of Guatemalans who have suffered injury at the hands of
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over a period time, it is unlikely that the right to individual
compensation has been established as a principle of customary
international law.
An analysis of international and regional instruments,
customary international law, and scholarly commentary suggests
that there is no general international legal right to individual
compensation for every human rights violation. Individual
compensation is mandated for a few violations, but is not made
available for all violations.
B. The Impact of Individual Compensation in the Transitional Justice
Context
Transitioning states often have difficult, unique, and
strategic decisions to make about the mechanisms of transitional
justice, including compensation. Some scholars argue that a
transitional state is not required to prosecute all violations, and
that treaties should be interpreted in a manner that avoids
imposing impossible obligations or causing harm.212 If a state is
neither obligated to prosecute all violations nor required to take
on the burden of impossible prosecutorial obligations, can the
same argument be extended to compensation programs?
In addition to the legal considerations, a state must also
evaluate public policy when faced with the prospect of awarding
individual compensation. The policy considerations are more
poignant in the transitional justice context than in developed,
stable states because of the transitional state's political and
financial situation and the daunting goal of securing peace and
democracy. 213 This Section discusses the general benefits of
individual compensation and the particular challenges it poses in
criminal governments have no chance whatsoever of seeing their reparation claims
adjudicated by the [Inter-American] court").
212. See Orentlicher, supra note 97, at 2598 ("To the extent that the purpose of
prosecutions is to vindicate the authority of the law and deter repetition of recent
crimes, it is not necessary that a transitional government prosecute all who participated
in a previous system of violations."); id. at 2600 ("[p]ursuant to general canons of
construction, the comprehensive treaties should be interpreted in a manner that avoids
imposing impossible obligations or duties whose discharge would prove harmful.").
213. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing the forward-looking goals
of transitional justice as securing peace and democracy); infra note 234 and
accompanying text (noting that transitional states are usually impoverished and
underdeveloped).
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the transitional justice context. This Section also outlines the
compensation-as-development paradigm as an alternative to
individual compensation.
1. Benefits and Challenges of Individual Compensation
There are benefits of awarding individual compensation that
align with the modern trend of recognizing the individual, and
not just the state, as rights-holder. Compensation is victim-centric
and focuses on the physical, emotional, and moral harm
personally suffered by the individual victim.2 14 In so doing, it
recognizes the victim and attempts to return the victim to the
status quo ante.215 Compensation is one of the most tangible
forms of justice. It is often easier to provide than some other
types of reparations because it is less threatening to political
officials-who might be worried that they will prosecuted-and
can be easier to administer. 216
Because compensation programs require the state to pay
monetary awards, however, they raise financial and economic
concerns. Past examples demonstrate that it is difficult to
successfully implement reparations programs in the face of
poverty, inequality, and exclusion.217
One aspect that a state might consider when assessing the
potential financial obligations of a compensation program is the
number of victims. The larger the number of victims, the less
likely it is that the state will have the resources to compensate
each person for the full extent of his or her injury. 218 If the state
214. See de Greiff, supra note 114, at 469 (noting that individual compensation
"respect[s] personal autonomy").
215. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (noting that reparations attempt to
right the wrong and return the victim to the status quo ante).
216. See Bassiouni, supra note 143, at 269 ("Often, compensation can be easier to
pursue than criminal prosecution because it is less threatening to authorities."); see de
Greiff, supra note 114, at 469 (noting that individual compensation "[m]ay be easier to
administer than alternative distribution methods").
217. See Alexander Segovia, Financing Reparations Programs: Reflections from
International Experience, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 114, at 650, 669
(citing El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, and Peru as examples of this argument).
218. See Heike Niebergall, Overcoming Evidentiary Weakness in Reparation Claims
Programmes, in REPARATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANFIY. SYSTEMS IN PLACE AND SYSTEMS IN THE MAKING 145, 146 (Carla
Ferstman et al. eds., 2009) (noting that the number of potential claimants "effectively
excludes the possibility of resolving the claims within the domestic court system");
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has limited financial resources, then the aggregate amount of
money it will be required to pay in a comprehensive program
may preclude it from rectifying all the human rights violations of
which it is guilty.219 As such, being fair to all victims-both in
ensuring that all victims are compensated, and in ensuring that
all victims are compensated fully-may be impossible.220 A
compensation program would likely be regarded as unfair or
insulting if it privileged certain victims and claims over others or
if the amount of compensation awarded was significantly less
than the harmed suffered. And if, as a result of a compensation
program, the state acquires public debt to finance the program,
the entire society is adversely affected because money is spent on
repaying that debt instead of on other social programs and
needs.22'
It has been suggested that third-party states should
contribute money for compensation programs, particularly if
they influenced or interfered in the conflict, but also for
humanitarian reasons. 222 While this is a possibility, past
experience demonstrates that there can be no expectation that
other states will provide adequate funding.223
Tomuschat, Individual Reparation, supra note 193, at 20 (adding that the available
national wealth is a limit to reparation recovery commensurate with the injury suffered).
219. See Debra Satz, Countering the Wrongs of the Past: The Role of Compensation, in
REPARATIONS: INTERDISCIPLINARY INQUIRIES 176, 189 (Jon Miller & Rahul Kumar eds.,
2007) ("Most countries simply lack the financial resources to offer full compensation to
victims, in cases in which the victims number in the thousands or even millions.");
Tomuschat, Reparation, supra note 192, at 174 ("Whenever chaos and anarchy set in, the
magnitude of the sums required for effective reparations makes it imperative not only
on economic, but also on legal grounds, to call into question the seemingly invincible
proposition that reparation must wipe out all of the negative consequences of an
injurious act.").
220. See Satz, supra note 219, at 189 ("Being fair to all the victims may mean that
full compensation for their losses, even if it could be calculated, is impossible.").
221. See Tomuschat, Indivudal Reparation, supra note 193, at 19 ("The debts of the
State are debts affecting everyone.").
222. See Segovia, supra note 217, at 658-59 ("There is broad consensus about the
fact that the international community could and should contribute to financing
programs of reparation, not only for humanitarian reasons and those of solidarity, but
also because in some cases foreign actors supported the military regimes or participated
directly in the internal conflicts of societies in transition.").
223. See id. at 659 (noting that past experience demonstrates that foreign
contributions to compensation programs have been modest and limited); Tomuschat,
Individual Reparation, supra note 193, at 20 ("Facing up to the hard consequences of its
past is a task that every nation must primarily discharge by its own efforts.").
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Individual compensation programs also pose administrative
and infrastructure limitations. If the class of victims is large, it is
difficult, if not impossible, to individually evaluate and process
individual claims for compensation. 224 Moreover, if a
compensation program requires a complex administrative
apparatus, large amounts of money will be spent on the
administration itself, rather than on satisfying claims.225
Concerning infrastructure, the judiciary is sometimes used to
calculate awards and administer funds. In a transitional state, it is
likely that the judiciary, if it exists at all, will be underdeveloped
and will lack the capacity to deal with compensation claims in an
orderly and timely manner.226 Even if the judiciary is capable of
assisting, mass human rights violations present unique challenges
regarding evidence, statutes of limitations, and the identification
of perpetrators.227
Individual compensation programs also have political
considerations. If a government lacks political will, a program will
be difficult to implement.228 This lack of political will might exist
224. See Falk, supra note 117, at 494-95 ("The magnitude of the harm
done ... makes it impractical to evaluate individual claims on a case-by-case basis in
most instances, and therefore is not consistent with the international approach based on
the individual that is embedded in international law."); Niebergall, supra note 218, at
147-48 (suggesting that past reparations programs "have forced administrators to
balance individual justice concerns and aspirations of individual victims with the
necessity to bring ajust solution to all victims within an acceptable timeframe").
225. See Niebergall, supra note 218, at 148 (noting that mass claims processing rely
on a substantial secretariat and modern information technology); Tomuschat,
Reparation, supra note 192, at 175 ("[L]arge parts of the monies available would have
been spent on a bureaucratic apparatus.").
226. SeeJaime E. Malamud-Goti & Lucas SebastiAn Grosman, Reparations and Civil
Litigation: Compensation for Human Rights Violations in Transitional Democracies, in THE
HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 114, at 537, 543 ("[I]n certain cases, the
transitional state may lack a judiciary capable of dealing with compensation in an
adequate and timely fashion."); see also supra note 102 and accompanying text (noting
the limitations ofjudicial infrastructure in transitional societies).
227. See Malamud-Goti & Grosman, supra note 226, at 545-46 ("[F]ailure to file an
action in due time is presumed to be an indication of a lack of interest on the part of the
plaintiff. ... Failure to file an action in due time may more likely derive from fear of the
perpetrators or from the belief, often justified, that the action will be unsuccessful while
the perpetrators remains in power."). It may also be difficult to identify perpetrators
where, as in Chile, the identification of perpetrators was made impossible as a result of
amnesty laws passed by the government. Id.
228. See Segovia, supra note 217, at 651 (arguing that governments do not always
have the political incentives and will to administer a reparations program-and that
transitional governments "have other economic and social priorities which could clash
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because the post-transition government wants to focus on the
future, rather than on the troubled past, which a compensation
program would require it to do.2 29 If the government determines
that its priorities are strengthening democratic institutions and
generating conditions for good governance, both of which will
require expenditures of public resources, it will be reluctant to
allocate money for backward-looking compensation programs.230
No more eloquently was this dilemma articulated than by
the Constitutional Court of South Africa in AZAPO v. South
Africa. Even though the focal point of the case was amnesty for
perpetrators of human rights violations, the court addressed the
competing goals of compensation and the reconstruction of
society.
The resources of the state have to be deployed imaginatively,
wisely, efficiently and equitably, to facilitate the
reconstruction process in a manner which best brings relief
and hope to the widest sections of the community,
developing for the benefit of the entire nation the latent
human potential and resources of every person ....
[I] t is much too simplistic to say that the objectives of the
Constitution could only properly be achieved by saddling the
state with the formal liability to pay, in full, the provable
delictual claims of those who have suffered patrimonial loss
in consequences of the delicts perpetrated with political
objectives by servants of the state during the conflicts of the
past.23'
This problem is especially poignant in states, such as
transitioning states, with limited financial resources where
decisions to allocate scarce resources are often prone to
with reparations proposals due to limited public funds and the considerable amount of
resources reparations programs require").
229. See id. at 651-52 ("[R]eparations are politically difficult issues to manage since
they entail digging in the past, which goes against the tendency in the policy of most
governments of looking ahead into the future. This is a vision that is reinforced by the
fact designing a policy of reparations involves making difficult decisions that could have
political consequences most governments are not always willing to assume.").
230. See id. at 653 (noting potential tensions that can arise when a state with scare
resources tries to strengthen democratic institutions, generate conditions of good
governance, and preserve macroeconomic stability).
231. Azanian Peoples Organization (AZAPO) v. President of the Republic of S. Mr.
1996 (4) SA 671 (CC), TT 43,46 (S. Mr.).
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politicization.232 Some scholars argue that where civil strife
victimizes a large number of people, symbolic measures of
acknowledgement with a needs-based conception of reparations
provide a more appropriate and effective path to recovery.233
2. Reparations and Compensation as Development
The challenges of development-including poverty, weak
institutions, poor infrastructure, and inequality-are likely to be
exacerbated in transitional societies where the preceding conflict
occurred in an already impoverished state.234 Simultaneously, the
consequences of failing to develop are more severe in states
trying to secure peace and democracy than in nontransitioning
states, particularly where at least one cause of the conflict is
related to underdevelopment.23 1
"Development" has many meanings and is measured in
various ways, but for purposes of this Note, development means
creating conditions for all people to build their full range of
232. See Segovia, supra note 217, at 655-56 ("Since it is generally the case that
available State resources are not sufficient to satisfy increasing social demands as well as
comply with the existing state responsibilities and functions owed by the State, it
necessarily has to allocate funds according to priorities, which in general respond to
political motivations coming as much from the government as from the political parties
represented in Congress.").
233. See Falk, supra note 117, at 492 (arguing that a needs-based approach would
try, at least, "to enable those who have been disabled, or find themselves in acutely
vulnerable circumstances, to be given the means by which to restore a modicum of
dignity to their lives.").
234. See RAMA MANI, BEYOND RETRIBUTION: SEEKING JUSTICE IN THE SHADOWS OF
WAR 3 (2002) ("The vast majority of armed conflicts today are located in low-income or
developing countries, whose indigent populations and fragile economies are further
impoverished in the process."); Pablo de Greiff, Articulating the Links between Transitional
justice and Development: justice and Social Integration, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND
DEVELOPMENT: MAKING CONNECTIONS 28, 29 (Pablo de Greiff & Roger Duthie eds.,
2009) (noting that transitional societies "are frequently beset by poverty, huge
inequalities, weak institutions, broken physical infrastructure, poor governance, high
levels of insecurity, and low levels of social capital"); Marcus Lenzen, Roads Less Traveled?
Conceptual Pathways (and Stumbling Blocks) for Development and Transitional justice, in
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT, supra, at 76, 78 (noting that many
transitional states are less developed); Roht-Arriaza, supra note 175, at 186 ("Most
communities affected by ... massive conflict were desperately poor before the conflict
started-indeed, in many cases poverty and inequality are key underlying causes of the
violence.").
235. See Lenzen, supra note 234, at 83 ("After a violence conflict or a period
marked by massive human rights violations, it is thus even more important to change or
develop the capacity of state (and societal) institutions to foster conditions for peace
coexistence for all citizens.").
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capabilities by expanding the freedoms people enjoy.2 36 This may
be done, at least in part, by addressing real or perceived socio-
economic, political, or cultural injustice and inequality.237
Development in transitional societies is a pressing concern
because the consequences of failing to develop, including civil
unrest and threats to peace and democracy, can be grave. Recent
scholarship has begun to explore the concept of reparations as
development whereby a reparations program is planned to
complement development.238 This approach has benefits and
drawbacks-and is controversial.
Where reparations are distributed to the community and
take the form of development programs, a greater number of
people benefit than if the reparations were distributed just to
individuals. Community reparations address harms to social
cohesion and recognize the wrong done to the entire
community, including those who might not otherwise be
categorized as victims but nevertheless may have been
detrimentally affected by the conflict.239 Community reparations
advance goals of social solidarity and equal citizenship.240 They
can also prevent nonvictims from resenting victims who receive
236. See generally AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999); see also Tony
Addison, The Political Economy of the Transition from Authoritarianism, in TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 234, at 110, 113 ("[D]evelopment is about
getting the 'right' policies and institutions in place to build up, over time, society's stock
of human and physical capital-thereby delivering rising prosperity accompanied by
absolute poverty reduction."); Naomi Roht-Arriaza & Katharine Orlovsky, A
Complementary Relationship: Reparations and Development, in TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 234, at 173 ("Development is increasingly conceptualized not
as a goal or end point but as an ongoing process, in which the agency, self-organization,
and empowerment of those at the bottom of the economic pyramid are at the same time
the means of reaching success and the goal itself.").
237. See MANI, supra note 234, at 8 (referring to this process as distributive justice);
Lenzen, supra note 234, at 84 ("Development should be concerned with the structural
conditions of inequality and poverty. . . .").
238. See generally Roht-Arriaza, supra note 175, at 186-89 (outlining the reparations
as development model); Roht-Arriaza & Orlovsky, supra note 236, at 170-207 (providing
a more extensive analysis of the reparations-as-development model).
239. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 175, at 186 ("Community-based development
projects recognize the wrong done to the community as a whole. . . ."); Robt-Arriaza &
Orlovsky, supra note 236, at 189 ("Collective reparations . .. respond to collective harms
and harms to social cohesion.").
240. See Roht-Arriaza & Orlovsky, supra note 236, at 185 ("[T]o the extent that
reparations programs emphasize the goals of social solidarity, recognition, and equal
citizenship, they can provide conduits for people to begin to exercise that citizenship in
myriad ways.").
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individual compensation. 24 What is more, community services
may actually rebalance power in favor of victims if nonvictims see
that new or enhanced services were brought to the community
because of the victims. 2 4 2 In an already fractured society trying to
heal the wounds of past conflict, new divisions could be
detrimental. Additionally, if living standards for the majority of
people improve, the society will more likely align itself with the
new political order and be interested in ensuring its
continuance. 243 As such, community reparations may address
post-conflict concerns like inequitable distribution of resources
and access to political and economic resources. 2 "
On a practical level, when the state channels disbursement
of community reparations through existing state institutions and
service-providers, the process is often more efficient, less
politically sensitive, and requires less new bureaucracy. 245 Third-
party states more interested in development might be more
willing to invest in community reparations as development than
they would in just a reparations program. 246 When community
reparations take the form of direct services, fraudulent behavior
by citizens seeking financial compensation from the state
decreases. 247 Finally, in community reparations programs, the
241. See id. at 182, 192 (suggesting that setting up dedicated services for victims, to
be used exclusively by victims, might create new resentments).
242. See id. at 194 ("If needed services for all come to the community because of
the needs .. . of victims and survivors, it provides them with a source of status and pride
in the eyes of their neighbors .... By making clear that victims are the reason that
services arrive, even if those services benefit everyone, collective reparations can begin to
address an existing power imbalance.").
243. See Addison, supra note 236, at 130 ("[I]f . .. living standards start to grow,
then the populace has some stake in the new political order; and demagogues will find it
harder to recruit followers when the young have new livelihoods.").
244. See MANI, supra note 234, at 9 ("The concern of distributive justice is how post-
conflict societies deal with grievances such as inequitable distributions of and access to
political and economic resources that underlie conflict.").
245. See Roht-Arriaza & Orlovsky, supra note 236, at 192 ("Collective reparations
may allow [governments] to funnel programs into existing ministries, seem more
efficient and less likely to be politically sensitive, require less new bureaucracy, and seem
more acceptable to budget-conscious managers and creditors.").
246. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 175, at 188 (arguing that if the issue is framed as
development rather than redress, funds from third-party states might be more
forthcoming); see also supra notes 222-23 (suggesting that it has been difficult to get
third-party states to provide funding for reparations programs).
247. See Roht-Arriaza & Orlovsky, supra note 236, at 187 ("[I]n countries with few
jobs and extensive poverty, it would be surprising if the promise of money did not elicit
all kinds of fraudulent behavior, including false claims of victimhood.").
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state does not have to define the class of victims eligible for
reparations; whenever the class of beneficiaries is expanded, it
lessens the benefits each beneficiary receives, thereby failing to
satisfy anyone. 248 Where resources are limited, the choice may be
between community reparations or small individual reparations
that are meaningless.249
Community reparations, however, can be problematic. First,
reparations might be a legal obligation for the responsible parties
to address past injustice against individuals. 250 When the state
does not provide reparations to individuals, the state does not
fulfill its legal obligation.251 Furthermore, community reparations
fail to recognize the specific harm to the individual and the
rights that the individual holds vis-A-vis the state. 252 Community
reparations also allow the state to provide that which it is already
supposed to provide-namely development-while
simultaneously fulfilling its legal obligation to redress past
injustice.253 Not only does this allow the state to bypass its
obligations, but it also turns victims into ordinary citizens who are
248. See Addison, supra note 236, at 131 ("Given the multiplicity of needs, it is
tempting to promise to do everything. Then the danger is that a weak implementation
capacity is spread too thinly, so that little if any tangible benefits results."); de Greiff,
supra note 234, at 40 ("Expanding the scope of beneficiaries will likely entail the
dilution of benefits to the point that no one is satisfied by them.").
249. See Roht-Arriaza & Orlovsky, supra note 236, at 193 ("[I]n conditions where
there is resource scarcity and a large number of victims, the choice may be between, on
the one hand, collective reparations and, on the other hand, no material reparations at
all, or individual compensation so meager as to be insulting.").
250. See id. at 202 ("To serve their expressive and symbolic function, reparations
should come primarily from the parties responsible for the violations."); see also supra
notes 113-22 (providing a detailed description of the categories of reparations).
251. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 175, at 188 (noting that human rights groups have
concerns that reparations as development is "an abdication of the state's legal obligation
to respond to past injustices").
252. See de Greiff, supra note 234, at 40 ("[R]eparations entail an
acknowledgement of responsibility and an effort to target victims particularly for special
treatment. . . ."); Roht-Arriaza & Orlovsky, supra note 236, at 189 ("Individual
reparations serve as recognition of specific harm to an individual, and of an individual's
worth as a rights-bearing citizen."); id. at 206 ("[Rjeparations must have at least some
individualized component to fulfill its goals. . . .").
253. See Roht-Arriaza & Orlovsky, supra note 236, at 192 ("Advocates have pointed
out that using reparations funds to provide nonexclusive goods or services to
underserved populations (including but not limited to victims) allows the government
to get off too easy: it need only do what it should be doing anyway and slap a reparations
label on it.").
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receiving no more than they ought to from the state.254 Finally,
because community reparations are presented as development
rather than a source of redress for harm suffered, the society
risks overlooking the significance of the harm.255
Nepal has an international legal obligation to provide
compensation for certain human rights violations. Where that
right is discretionary or nonexistent, however, Nepal has options
about how to proceed. Given the unique circumstances of the
transitional justice context, and the pressure to ensure the
survival of peace and democracy, Nepal, and other transitioning
states, might consider the compensation-as-development
program a viable alternative.
III. STRUCTURING A COMPENSATION PROGRAM IN NEPAL
AND OTHER TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES
One of the central questions of this Note is whether there is
an international legal right to individual compensation for
human rights violations. 25 6 While the transitional justice context
does not change legal obligations, it poses unique challenges. 25 7
A transitioning state is not only dealing with a record of past
human rights violations, but is also trying to secure peace,
enhance democracy, and develop.258 Attainment of these goals
requires financial commitments, as does a compensation
program. The question therefore becomes: can a state fulfill its
international legal obligation to provide compensation for
human rights violations while also working toward its long-term
254. See de Greiff, supra note 114, at 469 ("The more the program concentrates on
a basic service package, the less force the reparations will have, as citizens will naturally
think that the benefits being distributed are ones they have a right to as citizens, not as
victims."); Roht-Arriaza & Orlovsky, supra note 236, at 192 (noting that community
members "may consider the upgrading of their communities to be a right provided by
citizenship").
255. See Roht-Arriaza & Orlovsky, supra note 236, at 191 (noting that where the
projects have no tie to the nature or type of harms they are supposed to redressing,
there can be a "lack of understanding of their purported purposes among
beneficiaries").
256. See supra Parts LC and II.A (analyzing the international legal right to
compensation in instruments and jurisprudence).
257. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the challenges that exist in transitional justice
situations).
258. See supra notes 75, 235 and accompanying text (discussing the transitional
justice goals of peace, democracy, and development).
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goals of peace, democracy, and development? If a state can do
both simultaneously, how should the compensation program be
designed to optimize progress toward both ends?
This Part will first review the right to individual
compensation, in general and in the context of transitional
justice. Throughout, this Part will make recommendations for
the design of a transitional justice compensation program so that
it fulfills international legal obligations and supports the long-
term goals of transitional justice. The recommendations will be
directed at Nepal, but could be applied to other underdeveloped
transitioning states.
Victims of human rights violations have a broad right to
remedy and reparations and a narrow right to individual
compensation. 269 Individual compensation is a specific form of
remedy or reparations, but there is only a small category of
violations for which states are legally mandated to provide
individual compensation. 26 0 The current international legal
framework does not provide the right to individual compensation
for every human rights violation. 261 It is beyond the scope of this
Note to evaluate whether the rights for which there is a legal
obligation to provide compensation should be expanded, but
that is certainly a worthwhile inquiry.
A state has a legal obligation to provide compensation for
violations of rights protected in international instruments to
which the state is a signatory and which require compensation.
Nothing, however, prevents the state, on its own initiative, from
expanding the catalog of human rights for which it will provide
compensation if violated. Beyond its legal obligations, a state
should award compensation for as many human rights violations
that its financial capacity allows. Transitioning states, including
Nepal, however, are unlikely to be able to expand that catalog of
rights primarily because they tend be disproportionately poor. 26 2
259. See supra Parts I.C and II.A (analyzing the international legal right to
compensation in instruments and jurisprudence).
260. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the mandatory right to individual
compensation for certain human rights violations).
261. See supra Part II.A (analyzing the international legal right to individual
compensation).
262. See supra note 232 and accompanying text (noting the challenges to
development in the transitional justice context).
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They also face other major obstacles. 263 Therefore, a
compensation program in a transitioning state is likely to be
different from one in a developed, wealthy state.264 Given these
realities, how should Nepal design a compensation program?
First, it is necessary to examine Nepal's international legal
obligations to provide compensation as required by the
international instruments to which it is a signatory.265 If Nepal
does not provide compensation to victims of violations for which
the instruments require compensation, Nepal will violate its
international legal obligations. Strict enforcement of resource-
based rights, including compensation, is difficult; if Nepal is not
in compliance, the human rights community should pressure
Nepal to fulfill its legal obligations.
Second, because international legal obligations are only a
minimum requirement, Nepal should evaluate its ability to
provide compensation for a greater catalog of rights than is
legally obligated. Because doing so would require greater
financial resources, Nepal would have to evaluate several
important factors. Nepal should not make commitments that it is
unable to fulfill; victims might rely on the prospect of a promised
financial package, and if that package never comes or is
substantially delayed, they could be detrimentally affected. It
would be unethical to inform victims that the state will provide
them compensation and then not provide it. Additionally,
society, and notjust the victims, could potentially lose trust in the
new, post-conflict government if it makes promises it is unable to
fulfill. After conflict, the new government must distinguish itself
from the previous regime and establish its credibility.266 If the
state makes undeliverable promises in the interest of political
expediency, it could destabilize the government-and, worse still,
plunge the state back into conflict. Therefore, Nepal should not
promise compensation to victims of human rights violations,
263. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the financial, administrative, and political
challenges of transitional justice).
264. See supra note 210 (noting the differences between a reparations program in a
wealthy state and one in an underdeveloped state). Consider, for example, the
compensation program in the United States when it awarded compensation toJapanese-
Americans interned during World War II.
265. See supra Part I.C.6 (detailing Nepal's international legal obligations based on
the international instruments to which it is a signatory).
266. See supra note 76 and accompanying text (discussing the need for the post-
conflict government to demarcate itself from the conflict government).
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beyond those it is required to compensate, if it knows it cannot
financially provide that compensation in a timely manner.
Third, Nepal should consider the other mechanisms of a
comprehensive transitional justice program through which it can
provide justice. While compensation is the most tangible
remedy-and often the one most desired by victims-it is not the
only component of a transitional justice program.267
When a state such as Nepal cannot provide compensation to
all human rights victims, it still might have a legal obligation to
provide reparations or remedy. Both "reparations" and "remedy"
are broad concepts that come in many forms.268 This breadth of
options is advantageous in the transitional justice context
because it allows the state to select the mechanisms most
appropriate and applicable for its particular circumstances.
Unless legally obligated or otherwise decided, Nepal can provide
various forms of reparations and remedies, some of which do not
cost anything. For example, a state apology is a low-cost or no-
cost form of reparations that, when genuine, can help advance
the goals ofjustice, truth, and reconciliation. 26 9
Some victims may seek adjudication rather than
compensation; they want the person responsible for committing
human rights violations to be held accountable. That
adjudication could have a greater effect on the goals of
transitional justice than a compensation award.270 Nepal,
therefore, should ensure its domestic legislation criminalizes
human rights violations and incorporates its international legal
obligations. It might also examine and extend, if necessary, the
statute of limitations for certain crimes to cover human rights
violations that occurred during the internal conflict. Then Nepal
can encourage victims to bring cases in the domestic court
system. Nepal might even consider establishing a separate court
to adjudicate cases of human rights violations that occurred
during the internal conflict. In either instance, victims ineligible
267. See supra Part I.B.2 (outlining the mechanisms of a comprehensive transitional
justice program).
268. See supra notes 113-22 (providing a detailed description of the categories of
reparations).
269. See supra note 120 and accompanying text (listing a state apology as a form of
satisfaction, which is a category of reparations).
270. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text (outlining the benefits of
transitional justice prosecutions).
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for state compensation could seek compensation from the
individual perpetrator of the crime if the court finds the
perpetrator guilty of the offense in a civil case.
Prosecutions will require expenditures of limited state
financial resources (e.g., salaries for judges and court staff,
construction of new courthouses). A transitional justice
prosecution program, however, would advance progress on two
goals: fulfilling the right to remedy and bolstering the capacity of
the judiciary.271 A strong judiciary is an important element of a
post-conflict state because it can help end the pervasive culture of
impunity that likely existed before and during the conflict or was
a cause of the conflict.27 2
The most successful transitional justice program may be an
integrated and comprehensive one.27 3 No single mechanism
alone will meet all the goals of transitional justice. Significantly,
using different mechanisms in conjunction with one another can
fill in the gaps created when only some mechanisms are used. For
example, if a state decides to provide compensation for only
those violations for which it has a legal obligation, a truth
commission could still be valuable to those ineligible for
compensation. Using all of the mechanisms together makes it
more likely that every victim will receive some justice. Moreover,
a comprehensive program will likely affect all of society, even
those who were not victimized.
Fourth, Nepal should consider the compensation-as-
development model. 2 74 This model raises legitimate concerns,
the most important of which is that it does not address the harm
caused to an individual. 275 Nevertheless, the societal benefits can
be profound if the model is properly implemented.276 Instead of
expanding the class of victims eligible for compensation beyond
that which is legally required, or expanding the class to a number
271. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
272. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (noting how prosecutions and a
strong judiciary can counter the culture of impunity).
273. See supra Part I.B.2 (outlining the mechanisms of a comprehensive transitional
justice program).
274. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the reparations- and compensation-as
development paradigm).
275. See supra notes 250-55 and accompanying text (discussing the controversies of
the reparations- and compensation-as-development paradigm).
276. See supra notes 239-49 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits of the
reparations- and compensation-as-development paradigms).
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beyond its financial capacity, Nepal might consider investing that
money in large-scale development projects. The state would have
to decide the specific nature of these projects, but they could
include investment in education, health, or infrastructure.
Because development benefits all of society, rather than a select
number of individuals, it is more likely to realize the goals of
transitional justice. When basic needs are met, people are more
likely to embrace peace. When the government provides those
needs, people are more likely to trust the government (and the
emerging democracy).
Compensation as development should not be adopted in
every state that has perpetrated human rights violations; rather,
this model should be confined to states that are underdeveloped,
poor, and transitioning from war or authoritarianism to peace
and democracy. If a state has the financial resources to
compensate a large class of victims, it should do so. But where
those financial resources are limited, the state must make legally
strategic and practical choices about the most effective way to
proceed.
CONCLUSION
Nepal is on the cusp of progress, but its future of peace and
democracy is uncertain. Transitional justice offers a range of
options through which Nepal can provide justice to victims of
human rights violations. Nepal must fulfill its international legal
obligations, especially with respect to individual compensation.
Beyond that, however, Nepal should consider a reparations or
compensation-as-development program that will simultaneously
address the backward-looking (justice and truth) and forward-
looking (peace, democracy, and development) goals of
transitional justice. In so doing, Nepal will increase the likelihood
that the peace and democracy for which thousands of people
died will firmly take root and provide a foundation for a
prosperous future. Only then can Nepal have its Shangri-la.
